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1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of the present thesis is to analyze whether the government defence
expenditure, as a component of total public spending, is able to a¤ect the economic
performance of U.S., and/or account for the potential role in explaining scal policy
uctuations. Broadly speaking, our work aims to answer to the following question:
does military spending provide economic stimulation through higher aggregate de-
mand for goods and services, or does military spending retard economic performance
because it draws resources from more productive activities that can be devolved to
the civilian sector?
The present thesis is composed by three chapters which capture di¤erent aspects
about these arguments. The rst chapter empirically assesses the so called "Mili-
tary Keynesianism", i.e. the approach that treats the military budget as a source
of aggregate demand for goods and services and, therefore, a source of economic
stimulation. The military Keynesianism took centre stage in the policy debate with
John Maynard Keynes, who argued that in extreme situations the government should
spend on anything as a means of stimulating aggregate demand. Thus, the aim of
this chapter is to empirically test the Keynesian hypothesis, by using a long-run
equilibrium model for the U.S. economy. Our contribution, with respect to previous
works, is twofold. First, our inferences are adjusted for structural breaks exhibited
by the data concerning scal and monetary variables. Second, we show that the
results are sensitive to sub sample choices.
In the second chapter, our goal is to disentangle the components of government
spending in civilian and military expenditures into a standard DSGE new-Keynesian
model and analyze their role on the U.S. economy, with particular attention on
private consumption and wages. In particular, we focus on the changes in the e¤ects
of public spending components before and after a structural break that occurred in
U.S. economy around 1980. We assume that this break is related to a change in
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consumer behaviour, i.e. the increased asset market participation.
From a theoretical point of view, we assume a standard Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral EquilibriumModel (DSGE) with an economy with sticky prices and limited asset
market participation. Moreover, we assume the existence of a scal policy authority
that purchases consumption goods (divided in spending for military and non-military
sectors), raises (lump-sum and income) taxes and issues nominal debt. Finally, we
include a monetary authority, which sets its policy instrument, the nominal interest
rate. We estimate the theoretical model with a Bayesian approach, the so called
"strong econometric approach", which allows us to provide a full characterization of
the data generating process and a proper testing specication. The latter aspect is
particularly important for the scal shocks assessment.
In the last chapter, we focus on government spending multiplier and, in particu-
lar, on the e¤ects of di¤erent components of public spending on the U.S. economy.
We disaggregate total government spending into civilian and military expenditures
and estimate, through a structural VAR approach, their e¤ects separately on GDP
and private consumption. In this chapter, we introduce three main novelties with
respect to previous literature. First, we analyze the e¤ects of public spending on
the economy accounting for "within" complementarity/substitutability of military
and non-military expenditures. Second, we show that the nancing mechanism of
the di¤erent spending components is crucial for agents decision about consumption.
Finally, we assess that crowding in/out e¤ects of government spending components
on aggregate consumption are related to the existence of a precise portion of public
expenditure that stimulates/depresses a fraction of consumers. In this chapter, we
also develop a simple DSGE new-Keynesian model that can potentially account for
that evidence. Our framework shares many ingredients with recent dynamic optimiz-
ing sticky price models, though we improve on the assumption of the scal sector by
introducing non-military and military spending components. This allows us to show
that our empirical results can be reproduced by the theoretical model by comparing
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empirical and simulated impulse response functions.
3
2 THE EFFECTS OF MILITARY SPENDING ON THE
US ECONOMY: AN IS-MP APPROACH
2.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the dominant approaches to macroeconomic research in the past several
decades based on policy predictions is the IS-LM model. In this framework, the
debates between Keynesians and monetarists concerning the e¤ectiveness of mone-
tary and scal policy played a central role in the analysis of short-run uctuations
(Romer, 2000). One assumption largely criticized of this aggregate macroeconomic
model involved in the monetary policy behaviour of the central bank concentrated
on the aims targeting money supply. On the other hand, empirical policy researches
have shown that the central banks mainly use the tool of the interest rate to deter-
mine the monetary policy (MP) to characterize the money supply (Taylor, 2000).
Although such a framework is useful for understanding how the monetary policy
a¤ects the economy, through a closed relationship between ination and real interest
rates, it is ill-equipped to investigate how the scal policy shocks impact on aggre-
gate output through the composition of government spending. Focus on the latter
was motivated by our interest in understanding how society might best avoid the
distortions created by the presence of misallocation of government spending. In this
paper, we provide some empirical evidence of the e¤ects of the composition of scal
policy on the aggregate output when the categories of defence and civilian spend-
ing are explicitly distinguished within the government sector. Firstly, we assess the
model by identifying scal policy shocks as motivating forces for the non-stationarity
of output. Indeed, equilibrium of the IS-MP framework implies that, if the shock
of government spending components, namely defence and civilian spending, are un-
observable shocks I(1), these forcing variables will determine a long-run equilibrium
along with output and real interest rate. Secondly, we are interested in documenting
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and discussing the e¤ects of a particular kind of government spending the defence
spending  on the long-run output since the empirical evidence does not provide
a clear picture if defence spending stimulates, through higher demand and innova-
tions, the economy or retards economic performance by crowding out e¤ects (Gold,
2005). Thus, this paper reviews the debate in line with the new-Keynesian approach
developed by Atesoglu (2002), by updating the sample of data in the U.S.
Theoretically, the well-known hypothesis of the Keynesian approach, that treats
the military budget as a source of aggregate demand for goods and services, suggests
that positive government spending should induce economic stimulation by means of
an income multiplier e¤ect. In the extreme case, this government economic policy
is known as military Keynesianism, when the scal policy devotes large amounts of
spending to nance the defence sector (Mintz & Hicks, 1984). The channel through
which military spending can a¤ect the economy is based on boosting utilisation of
capital stock and higher employment. Positive changes in capital stock utilisation
may lead to increase prot rate which, in turn, drives to higher investment in short
run (Dunne, Smith, & Willenbockel, 2004; Kollias, Manolas, & Paleologou, 2004;
Smith & Dunne, 2001). However, the utilisation e¤ect of capital stockmay have
much less pronounced output e¤ects in a longer span (Dakurah, Davies, & Sampath,
2001; Dritsakis, 2004). The defence economics literature has identied with the
opportunity cost of defence spending the e¤ects of investment crowding out which
turns out to be a drag on economic take-o¤ (Sandler & Hartley, 1995).
Focusing our attention on empirical analysis, it is known that the robustness of
the aforementioned test of a long-run model e¤ect of defence spending on aggregate
output could be better obtained by working with quarterly frequency data. For the
US, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) produces quarterly data for the
categories of government defence and civilian spending.
In summary, this paper theoretically justies and empirically tests two hypothe-
ses: (i) the e¤ects of defence spending on output depend on the long-run equilibrium
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model that also includes the variables of monetary policy and government civilian
spending; (ii) defence spending, as a component of public spending, positively and
signicantly impact on the long-run output. In the US, the empirical identication
of a cointegrating vector shows a coherence of data with the predictions of the Key-
nesian model. By assessing the estimated parameters of the models, we nd that
the relationship between defence spending and output is strongly sample-dependent
with a fall in the elasticity values in more recent years.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We discuss conceptual issues in Section
2.2. Section 2.3 provides an overview of econometric specications. Section 2.4
presents the data, shows tests for the identication of the model and discusses the
estimation results to shed some light on the Keynesian e¤ects of defence spending
on output. Concluding remarks are o¤ered in Section 2.5.
2.2 THEORY: A SIMPLE MACROECONOMIC MODEL
In this section, an IS-MP model, that identies the policy scal shocks by using the
defence and civilian spending components of the public budget sector, will be formu-
lated. To organize the discussion, a stripped-down baseline model is expounded as a
version of the one described by Atesoglu (2002), to characterize a number of broad
principles that underlie optimal policy management. We then consider scal policy
implications by adding various real world complications to test how the prediction
from theory is linked with policy-making in practice. Specically, it will serve as a
basis for the empirical work to assess the impact of the government defence spending
on economic stimulation.
Because we are interested in characterizing scal policy rules in terms of compo-
sition of the government budget, the model we use evolves as in Romer (2000) and
Taylor (2000), and is derived by assuming that the real interest rate is predetermined
by the central bank1. The main change in the monetary policy rule is that it re-
1 In the complete version of the new macroeconomic model, the real interest rate is explained by additional
6
places the assumption to target the money supply with a simple interest rate rule, as
supported by the central banks behaviour in the developed countries (Taylor, 1993).
On the other hand, the importance of this assumption may depend on its applica-
tions. For example, it might be reasonable to ignore that the real interest rate may
depend on aggregate output, when applied to the e¤ects of government spending in
the civilian and defence categories, if the aim is to examine their e¤ects on aggregate
output rather than to assess the new-Keynesian model2.
Below, we formally document the theoretical framework and discuss the assump-
tion of the model. Let Rjt denote the measure of type-j interest rate chosen as
a target indicator by the central bank in period t to drive the monetary policy3.
Then, the aggregate output, the amount of the nal goods and services produced
in the economy, is denoted as Yt. Since the aggregate income is Yt = W (rjt), the
mathematical formulation of the IS equilibrium equation requires that:
Yt =  Rt + t (Eq. 1)
where t is a stochastic term that includes shocks of scal policy and/or net export.
The right-hand side of the IS equation describes the known inverse relationship be-
tween the (real) interest rate targeted by the central banks choices and aggregate
output. The stochastic term of equation (Eq. 1) plays a central role in the following
analysis since we will concentrate our estimations on the e¤ects of government de-
fence spending. It is worth keeping in mind the intuitive meaning behind it. If this
specic component of scal policy increase(s), the shock on the IS curve generates a
positive shift on output and a new equilibrium in the output-real interest rate space is
produced. Let M and G denote defence and civilian components of total government
spending, respectively; we will identify these shocks as scal policy shocks.
equations.
2 It is worth noting that the straightforward assumption that the central bank is able to follow a real interest rate
rule makes the model Keynesian.
3See Atesoglu (2007) for a discussion on the choice rule of the interest rate target.
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Let us now turn to the real interest rate. This variable is assumed to be only
dependent on ination such that the behaviour rule generates a monetary policy
(MP). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that: rt = , where  is the ination rate
assumed to be predetermined (known) by the central bank. A number of implications
emerge from this baseline case on which monetary policy is rmly based. Focusing
on evaluating scal policy shocks, the main result is that the central bank adjusts the
nominal short rate one-for-one with perfect foresight of (expected future) ination.
That is, it should instantaneously adjust the nominal interest rate such that it does
not alter the real interest rate (and aggregate demand).
To sum up, since the central banks choice of the real interest rate is strictly
predetermined by ination rate, the real interest rate rule can be approximated by
a horizontal line in the outputreal interest rate space. Thus, the IS curve can be
used to assess the impact of, government components of expenditure on aggregate
output.
Rather than work through the details of the derivation, which are available in
Appendix A, we directly introduce the key aggregate relationships by the reduced
form of the model. For convenience, the theoretical framework abstracts from the
way by which public expenditure was nanced. This abstraction does not a¤ect any
qualitative conclusions as we will discuss. The model specication is formulated as
follows:
Yt = 

0 + 

2Mt + 

3Gt + 

4Rt +  t (Eq. 2)
where  t term of equation (Eq. 2) contains net export shocks as shown in Appendix
A.  = (0; 

2; 

3; 

4) represents the vector of parameters to be estimated. Though
the model is quite simple, it nonetheless contains the main ingredients of richer
frameworks that are used for policy analysis. Within the model, as in practice,
the instruments of scal policy based on the composition of government spending,
account for the short-term uctuations. However, we would like to remark that
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the presence of non-stationary (trending) variables of government expenditure might
a¤ect the long-run relationship. In the next section, a dynamic reduced form model
will enable to test the presence of long-run e¤ects of the Keynesian stimulus on the
economy.
2.3 THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
Given equation (Eq. 2), we discuss its specication as a cointegrated system. It
rstly considers the vector autoregressive (VAR) formulation and describes the cor-
responding vector error correction (V ECM) representation. In Section 4, this model
will then be applied to test the impact of defence spending on output in the US.
Formally, we consider an extended V AR(p) specication for a m 1 vector of vari-
ables:
Xt = 0 + 1T + hDth +
pX
i=1
AiXt i + "t t = 1; :::; T (Eq. 3)
with : i = (0; 1; :::)
and : Dth =
8><>: 0 if t < h0 if t  h
where 0 is a m  1 constant term, 1 is a m  1 coe¢ cient vector related to the
deterministic trend, Dth is a d 1 vector containing the likely presence of structural
changes (shift dummies) and h the corresponding m  d matrix of parameters4. Ai
is a mm matrix of unknown parameters, while "t is a Gaussian white noise process
with covariance martix 
 and p the lag order of the VAR. Equation (Eq. 3) can be
4 In the literature no exact denitions of structural breaks or structural changes have been given, since breaks or
changes are interpreted as changes of regression parameters (Maddala and Kim, 1998). In what follows it is su¢ cient
to refer to structural changes or structural breaks as changes of the deterministic components of the time series, such
that the terms breaks and changes as equivalent.
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rewritten in a V ECM form as:
Xt = 0 +X

t 1 +
p 1X
i=1
 iXt i +
p 1X
j=1
jDt j + "t (Eq. 4)
where :  =
 
pX
i=1
Ai   Ip
!
and :  i =  
pX
j=t+1
Aj
nally : j =   j with j = 1; :::; p  1
The matrix of parameters  (mm+ 2) describes the long-run relationships of the
VECM among the variables in vector Xt 1 = [Xt 1;Dt;T ]
0
. A necessary condition
is that the polynomial characteristics associated with the V AR can determine the
stability of the system.  i refers to the short-run dynamics of the system Xt i,
while Dt j characterises the persistence of a shock of the variables included in the
cointegration space by means of the vector of shift dummy variables.
Under general conditions, the V ECM equation (Eq. 4) is I(1) and cointegrated
and can be written as5:
Xt = 0 + 
Xt 1 +
p 1X
i=1
 iXt i +
p 1X
j=1
jDt j + t (Eq. 5)
where :  =
h

0
; ; 
i
and :  =  01
and :  =  0
In equation (Eq. 5)  is a m r matrix,  is a (m+ 2) r matrix and r (0 < r < m) is
the cointegration rank of the system.
V ECM equation (Eq. 5) is the extended model of this article. The residual
5The set of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions so that Equation (Eq:4) is I(1) and cointegrated are: i) the
roots of the characteristic polynomial are outside the unit circle; ii) t = 
0
where  and 
0
are matrices of full rank
r
0
, 0 < r < m; iii) the matrix obtained by multiplying the orthogonal complement of the matrix and the parameter
matrix of long run is non-singular (Pesaran et al., 2000).
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r  1 vector ut = 
0
Xt in equation (Eq. 5) is trend-stationary and, under suitable
unitary identifying normalization, can be interpreted as being a vector of deviations
of observable variables from the long run equilibrium relationships.
With respect to the theoretical discussion in Section 2, we have assumed that the
cointegrating rank is given by r = 1. The long run equilibrium levels are predicted by
equation (Eq. 5) by identifying the block decomposition of Xt =

X
0
1t; X2t
0
, where
X1t = (Yt) and X2t = (Mt; Gt; Rt) is the 3 1 vector containing real defence and civilian
spending and the real interest rate. The deviation of estimations from observable
output can therefore be obtained as:
ut 1 = Xt 1 =
h
I1; 
0
2; #; 
i
266666664
X1t 1
X2t 1
Dt
T
377777775
= X1t 1   
0
2X2t 1   #Dt   T (Eq. 6)
As we shall see in the next section, it is possible that some institutional decisions
regarding monetary or scal policies can modify the structure of long-run patterns
of time series. From an econometric point of view, their exclusion may be a cause
of possible misspecications of the model and of the inconsistency in the estimation
results. In contrast, modelling structural changes inuences the cointegrating rank
inference. This question refers to the decision problem of whether one may still use
the standard cointegration tests to avoid possible power losses and size distortions
caused by modelling structural shifts or whether it is recommended to use cointe-
gration tests that take such breaks into account. In the latter case, the proposals
by Johansen, Mosconi, and Nielsen (2000) and Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2000a)
can be regarded as generalizations of the procedures by Johansen (1992, 1995) and
Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2000b), respectively.
In order to empirically test the best dynamic specication that rationalizes the
data, nested models are obtained by setting  = 0, in which the presence of a linear
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deterministic trend is excluded from equation (Eq. 6), or by setting  = 0 where
a model without a shift dummy is specied, or by a long run specication that
restricts both the hypothesis tests. From the conditions to derive equation (Eq. 6),
it follows that a cointegrated system is obtained by a reduced rank of the  matrix.
In a parsimonious long run dynamic model, inference on the number of cointegration
relationships can be carried out by testing the hypothesis:
H (r) = rank ()  r against the alternative H (m) = rank ()  m (Eq. 7)
for r = 0; 1; :::;m   1. By maximizing the log-likelihood of equation (Eq. 6) under
both the null and alternative hypotheses, we derive statistics of the likelihood ratio
or trace that have non standard distribution. Thus, the empirical specications that
include the presence of a constant term or linear deterministic trend uses the tabulate
quantiles of the trace statistics derived by Johansen (1995), while when a break(s) is
incorporated in the level of the time series the rank test is carried out by Saikkonen
and Lutkepohl (2000a).
2.4 TESTING MODEL IMPLICATION
2.4.1 DATA
The data used for testing the model of equation (Eq. 5) for the US were obtained
from di¤erent sources. Quarterly data of the government sector at current prices are
classied in defence and civilian categories of government spending and were available
by the NIPA, while the other macroeconomic series and deator were taken from the
International Financial Statistic (IFS) reports redacted yearly by the International
Monetary Found. We transformed the original variables into real terms of logarithms
by the index price for the GDP at the constant value of 2000, except the real in-
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terest rate6. On the other hand, the real interest rate was set up as the di¤erence
between the nominal 3-month treasury bill rate and the annual rate of growth in
the consumption price index (cpi). It is worth noting that the data available on this
indicator constrained the beginning of a more extended sample: the sample for the
empirical tests spans from 1957:1 to 2005:4. Fig. 1 describes the patterns of the four
macroeconomic variables (in logarithm) that are included in equation (Eq. 5). As it
is possible to note on the top right of the gure is reported the pattern of real defence
spending in the US. What is immediately evident is that, while the long-run pattern
of defence spending has remained stable enough (or slightly increasing) in the last 50
years, the prole of the graph appears to be event-driven with large cyclical spikes
corresponding to wars (or threat of wars) (Gerace, 2002; Gold, 2005). The levels of
real government defence spending show that a sharp rst peak in the data reects
the Vietnam War, a second one is in correspondence with the worsening tensions of
the Cold War during Reagans Presidency and the rst Iraq attack while, after 10
years in which the defence spending dropped, there was an upswing in response to
terrorist attacks7.
In addition, the empirical studies have shown that the patterns of the US military
spending and, in general, of the public sector during the 1960s are unambiguously
more volatile and it might be responsible for a strong Keynesian stimulus with respect
to the successive periods. This is, for example, the Golds thesis (1997) that sustains
that beginning from the 1970s, a narrower and more stable range of the US defence
spending (with respect to the long-run trend of the output) generated an ine¤ective
impact on the economy, the latter a¤ected by the decline in output volatility over the
past decades. In this regard, below we shall test the signicance of defence spending
6Gold (2005) criticizes the results of Atesoglu (2004) derived by a chained price index for GDP to deator military
spending series. The core of his criticism is that since ination in the defence sector has tended to out pace overall
ination, this may understate defence ination and overstate the growth in defence spending. However, the use of
deator of the GDP in the US to obtain real values of the GDP is close to the results that are possible to obtain
with a chained price index (Landefeld, Moulton, & Vojtech, 2003).
7The events of war or the threats of war adopted in our sample, that lead to large military buildups, are close to
the political events described by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and used in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004)
to identify changes in scal policy in the neoclassical context.
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on output for the sub-sample 1970:1 to 2005:4, by assuming the presence of internal
substitutability e¤ects of the US government expenditure components (i.e. defence
and civilian spending) in favour of the civilian sector. For this sub-period, long-run
output responses are, therefore, expected to be greater (and statistically signicant)
for trended-increased civilian spending with respect to the dynamics of the military
sector. It is worth remarking that the central theme of Keynesian economics, associ-
ated with the e¤ectiveness of scal policy as a stabilization tool, is maintained and
uctuations are, therefore, associated with variations in the e¢ ciency with which
productive resources are used. On the other hand, the statistical hypothesis of a
nonstationary data-generating process for defence spending, as well as for the other
variables of the model specied in (Eq. 2), leads to the need to test the possibility
of e¤ects of the long-run on output.
Fig. 1: Quarterly macroeconomic variables in logarithm for United States
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From a Keynesian point of view, a substantial decline in output volatility may
also be attributed to better monetary policies. Martin and Rowthorn (2005) have
documented that a rise or fall in the volatility of economies coincided with changes
in ination volatility, suggesting that this may have also been a contributing factor.
Thus, starting from the assumption of the model in Section 2.2, we concentrate
on the measure of real interest rates and its impact on monetary policies regarding
output. The real interest rate pattern (bottom right of Fig. 1) reveals the presence of
some volatility in the time series during the 1970s. While it is known that exogenous
shocks, caused by the oil crisis in 1973, invested countries over the world and, in
turn, the sharp decrease in the real interest rate due to high levels of ination. A
simple inspection shows the likely presence of a structural break, related to the fourth
quarter of 1979, as a change in the manner of conducting monetary policy. In fact,
Federal Reserve switched from pegging the Federal Fundsinterest rate to a policy
of reserve targeting, resulting in more variability in interest rates.
Finally, the drop in the real interest rate for the US economy, generated by the
2001 terrorist attacks, is in line with an exceptional active response of the FED
to an unexpected negative impulse of the business cycle. As strongly suggested by
Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2000a), both of these break points will be used to assess
the robustness of the long-run relationship and the estimated parameters of the
theoretical model. This is what we shall do in next sub-section.
2.4.2 COINTEGRATION TESTS, ESTIMATED COINTEGRATING VECTORS AND
POLICY IMPLICATION
Given Xt =

X
0
1t; X2t
0
, dened as before, the unrestricted V AR (equation (Eq. 3)) was
estimated over the countriessamples. The number of lags (p) were not xed a priori
but derived by the information criteria. The parsimonious choice of lags, namely
p = 6 for the complete sample reveals that the disturbances of the unrestricted VAR
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model can be approximated as the realisations of a white noise multivariate process.
After xing the lags of the V AR (and hence of the corresponding VECM para-
meterization), the analysis is carried out by selecting the cointegration rank of the
system. Consistently with equation (Eq. 6), a linear trend was restricted to belong
to the cointegrated space for the US because it seems clear, on the basis of Fig.
1, that at least three of four variables contain a deterministic trend. Moreover, as
suggested by the descriptive analysis, we included a shift-dummy for a rst break
point related to the US monetary policy change in October 1979. This institutional
change determined more variability in the level of the real interest rate, leading to the
issue of rank instability in the cointegrating matrix. Finally, a second shift-dummy
was included in the specication model to account for the 9/11 terrorist attack, as
repeatedly used in studies that assessed the (economic) e¤ects of this unexpected
event (Blomberg, Gregory, & Athanasios, 2004; Virgo, 2001).
The rst column of Table 1 reports the results from the US cointegration test over
the entire sample. Let r denote the number of cointegrating vectors. As shown in the
methodological section, the trace test is a sequential test that moves until the null
hypothesis (Eq. 7) cannot be rejected. For the entire data sample, the hypothesis
of H0 : r = 0 is rejected at the 90% signicant level. As for the presence of one
cointegrating vector, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the usual signicance
level. Thus, in line with the previous empirical results of Atesoglu (2002) for the
US economy, the data support the evidence of one cointegrating vector between
endogenous variables, namely aggregate output and real interest rate, with I(1) scal
policy shocks identied by the defence and civilian spending. This (Keynesian)
evidence enables using this model to infer the relevant e¤ects of the disaggregate
measures of scal policy shocks.
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Table 1: Cointegration tests and estimated cointegrating vectors8
The estimated parameters of the US cointegrating vector are given in Table 1
(bottom of column 1). As stated above, we use a maximum likelihood estimator to
obtain the estimated elements of the cointegrating vector, while normalization has no
impact on the information concerning structural parameters of the model reported
in Appendix A. In what follows the parameters associated with the aggregate out-
put variable will be normalized to unity. Cointegration estimated parameters have
signs consistent with those in equation (Eq. 2) and their inference reveal a statisti-
cally signicant relationship among the real variables of output, defence and civilian
8The trace test statistic for cointegration and the maximum likelihood estimator for the cointegrating vector are
obtained from Johansen (1995). Test statistics are adjusted for the presence of a structural break in the time series
(Saikkonen & Lutkepohl, 2000a). An asterisk (*) in the upper part of the table indicates that the null hypothesis
over the rank of cointegration rejected at 90% signicant level, while in the round brackets are reported the p-values
of the estimated parameters.
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spending and interest rate. Moreover, the data provide fairly strong support that the
US monetary policy change (October 1979) and the 9/11 terrorist attacks a¤ect the
long-run equilibrium as well as it is statistically relevant to include the time trend.
Specically, as in Atesoglu (2002), the signicant e¤ects of the US government de-
fence spending on aggregate output seem to conrm the predictions of the theoretical
model. However, taking the longest view rst, our elasticity estimations are much
weaker than Atesoglu (2002). The estimated value is reduced to 0:1 [with respect
to Atesoglus estimation, 0:57]. Inspection of the full sample in Fig. 1 conrms a
slight increase in the defence-spending patterns, mainly sustained by the large mil-
itary spending of the aforementioned political events. The intuition to test is that
the presence of I(1) shocks of the US defence spending may be responsible of the
slight positive relationship with aggregate output but, linked with Gold statement,
this quantitative relationship may be sensitive to the sample period. Thus, we re-
estimate the long-run model for the sub-sample from 1970:1 to 2005:4. The results
presented in the second column of Table 1, without the presence of a time trend9,
support the hypothesis test, highlighting a much lower and insignicant defence-
spending impact on the economy, while it registered a sharp increase in the impact
of civilian spending (from 0:42 in the full sample to 1:10 in the sub-sample).
Though this result may solve the puzzle of the e¤ect of defence spending generated
by the gap of data inspection and empirical results (Gold, 2005), the increase of
civilian spending complementarities on aggregate output needs an explanation for the
central role it assumes in the economy and for its relevant scal policy implications.
It is empirically documented that the decline in the pattern of US defence spending
was substituted by an increasing civilian investment in new technology. This di¤erent
government allocation shifted the military sectors central role to one of creating spin-
o¤ and complementary relationships of demand in the economy towards the civilian
9According to the hypothesis test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the trend parameter  is not di¤erent
from zero by a 2-test.
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sector and showed the switch of the defence to an economically mature sector10.
In conclusion, the long-run policy mechanism at work seems, therefore, to struc-
turally sustain greater returns from civilian investments even with political events
(wars or threat of wars) that increased US military spending. However, this may only
be a part of the story. More convincingly, the scal and monetary policy responses,
designed as tools for aggregate demand management, are jointly responsible for the
fall in discretional defence-spending changes in US output volatility. A source for
such empirical result may be identied in the role of monetary policy as one de-
terminant of economic and political stability. The increased credibility of ination
targets and the role of the central banks in the last two decades have been considered
as being responsible for the fall in economic volatility (Martin & Rowthorn, 2005).
We nd conrmation of this assumption in Table 1, where the signicance of the
real interest rate for both empirical specications is a strong support for the model
specication and shows its relevance for policy-makers as a countercyclical tool.
Finally, the number of cointegrating vectors corresponds to 1 in the VAR. As a
conrmation, we reported the estimated vector of the error correction model both
for the complete and subsample (Figs. 2 and 3). In all cases the estimated residuals
range around the long-run equilibrium patterns.
10The evidence suggests that the dynamics described made the policy makers aware of appropriateness of policies
even if the spending induced by the wars lobby and defence industry are relevant components of the US economy.
As an example, it is known that the reaction after the 9/11 terrorist attack to account for the predictable downturn
business cycle cut the interest rate and increased the level of government defence spending. The latter policy, nanced
by a federal government debt was, however, perceived as a temporary event addressed to guarantee national and
international security. Contrary to the expectations of government spending substitutability, was documented the
constant growth of non-defence category around its equilibrium pattern justifying the leading role in a new-Keynesian
perspective.
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Fig. 2: Vector Error Correction Model: Full Sample (1957:1-2005:4)
Fig. 3: Vector Error Correction Model: Sub-Sample (1970:1-2005:4)
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper aims to empirically test whether government defence spending, as a com-
ponent of public spending, signicantly a¤ects the long-run aggregate output pattern.
We use a Keynesian theoretical framework that explicitly account for its potential
role in explaining scal policy uctuations. On the other hand, since the components
of scal policy shocks are identied as the motivating force for the non-stationarity of
aggregate output, a stable long-run relationship among the macroeconomic variables
is a necessary condition to accomplish their impact.
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The econometric results are carried out for the US over the period 1957-2005,
while a sensitivity analysis is included by estimating the theoretical model for a
sub-sample and by including shift dummies to account for institutional or policy
changes.
By discussing the empirical results, we found that aggregate data provides con-
sistent evidence that defence spending, as well as civilian spending are cointegrated
with output and real interest rate, in line with the theoretical suggestions for the
US economy. On the other hand, answering the question whether defence spending
provides economic stimulation is more complex. Although we obtain a positive and
signicant impact of government defence spending on output, that supports the hy-
pothesis of a military Keynesianism, underpinning the dimension and the pattern of
elasticities for the sub-sample, the hypothesis at work becomes questionable.
The estimated elasticity of government defence spending on output is really low.
Even if the dimension of impact might be surprising for some, these estimates are
highly in line with the descriptive evidence of the time series. More than a part of
the long-run pattern between government defence spending and output, the signif-
icance of this elasticity appears linked with the persistence in event-driven govern-
ment spending. Switching government priorities in favour of supplying civilian goods
and services rather than nancing federal defence spending may be responsible for
signicant fall in output elasticity.
Given these dynamics, a straightforward prediction of a revised and declining role
of the defence sector for the economy can be made. However, under the threat of
international terrorism, new army policy initiatives (and the consequent rise in the
defence spending) were announced between the end of 2001 and the middle of 2002,
so that government priorities regarding international security may revitalize the pro-
cyclical e¤ects of the military sector on aggregate output. Because of the robustness
of our ndings, any sample extensions are left for future work.
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2.6 APPENDIX
In line with theoretical suggestions of Romer (2000) and Taylor (2000), the empirical
specication for testing the impact of defence spending on aggregate real output in
equation (Eq. 1) is build up by a new macroeconomic Keynesian model under the hy-
pothesis that the real interest rate, R, is given. Below, we sketch the straightforward
structural cross model, as in Atesoglu (2002), in which the variables are expressed
in real terms:
Yt = Ct + It +Xt +Mt +Gt
where: Yt = aggregate output, Ct = consumption, It = investment, Xt = real net
export, Mt = defence spending and Gt = civilian spending.
 Consumption function:
Ct = d+ e (Yt   Tt) , Tt = real taxes
 Tax function:
Tt = n+ gYt
 Investment function:
It = h  iRt, real interest rate
 Net export function:
Xt = l  mYt   nRt
The parameters of the reduced form of equation (Eq. 1) in the body of the text,
0, 

2, 

3 and 

4, can, therefore, be determined by substituting the aforementioned
functions of the economic aggregates into the output-income equation. Formally we
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obtain an extended relationship as given:
Yt = d+ e (Yt   (n+ gYt)) + (h  iRt) + (l  mYt   nRt) +Mt +Gt
Finally, solving the equation for Yt, we obtain:
0 =
d  en+ h+ l
1  e (1 + g) +m
2 = 

3 =
1
1  e (1 + g) +m
4 =
  (i+ n)
1  e (1 + g) +m
that represent the parameters to estimate in equation (Eq. 2).
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3 HOW DETERMINANT ARE MILITARY SPENDING
SHOCKS ON THE ECONOMY? A BAYESIAN DSGE
APPROACH FOR THE US
3.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most prominent issues in macroeconomics concerns the e¤ect of an increase
in government spending. Even if it has been largely used the aggregate measure of
government, there is no widespread agreement on the answer. At the theoretical
level, macroeconomic models often di¤er regarding the implied e¤ects of a rise in
government spending on consumption. In that regard, the textbook IS-LM model
and the standard RBC model provide a stark example of such di¤erential qualitative
predictions.
From an empirical point of view, recent empirical studies as Fatás et al. (2001),
Blanchard et al. (2002), Perotti et al. (2005), Galí et al. (2007) have suggested
that the transmission of scal policy shocks may have actually changed around the
early 1980s. Indeed, these studies found a lower persistence of scal shocks in the
more recent period. As Bilbiie et al. (2009) argued, this break is related to the
role of private consumption behaviour, i.e. the increased asset market participation.
In fact, retail nancial markets were subject to signicant restrictions until the late
1970s. Bilbiie and Straub (2006) argue that these restrictions may have e¤ectively
prevented a large fraction of households from smoothing consumption in the desired
way. As Galí et al. (2007) observed, shut out from asset markets, such households
would tend to exhibit an extreme version of Keynesian consumption behaviour.
This explains the strong crowding-in e¤ects of government spending documented for
the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, one may conjecture that the change in scal
shocks around 1980 is critically related to the nancial liberalization occurring in that
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period. Specically, deregulation and nancial innovation may have widened private
access to asset markets, reducing the number of households who fail to smooth their
consumption proles (in response to government spending shocks).
In this paper, we analyze all these aspects focusing our analysis on two di¤erent
components on public spending. Indeed, we propose a model where the key deci-
sion is the division of the total government resources between endogenous consumer
decisions of private expenditure and the allocation of military and civilian spend-
ing by public sector. Our central assumption is that spending decisions for di¤erent
government components are independent. This idea is closely linked to military Key-
nesianism that takes centre stage in the policy debate. For example, Martin Feldstein
(see, Wall Street Journal article in 2008) suggested that any DoD budget cuts were
misguided. He argued that the US government recognised the need for increasing
in government spending to o¤set the decline in consumer demand in the economy
and sustained that a rise in military spending would be the best way to provide this
stimulus. This view does seem to have other supporters/proponents, particularly in
the US. We extend these arguments by a new-Keynesian framework to nd a more
general explanation to the possible sources of crowding in/out e¤ects in consumption
observed in the data. As in Galí et al. (2007) we incorporate into a RBC-model a
share of households who do not have access to bonds market and who consume their
current disposable income at each date11. Furthermore, price stickiness and central
banks behaviour are also determinant in the consumption dynamics in response to
a government spending shock (Linnemann and Schabert, 2003).
In order to analyze the changes in scal shocks before and after any of the po-
tentially important changes to nancial markets, and the business cycle in general,
we estimate U.S. time series data for 1954:3-1979:2 (S1) and 1983:1-2008:2 (S2). In
11Another view based on households preference has been stressed to explain the increase in consumption following a
government expenditure expansionary shock. For instance, Linnemann (2006) argues that taking the complementarity
between consumption and worked hours into account into a RBC-model, results in crowding-in e¤ects on consumption.
Indeed, the negative wealth e¤ect resulting from the rise in government expenditure has a positive impact on labour
supply, increasing the marginal utility on consumption and then consumption
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particular we focus on the changes in the e¤ects of di¤erent government spending
components on private consumption and wages. In our estimates, we use ve key
macroeconomic time series: the ination rate, the short-term nominal interest rate,
real aggregate government spending, real expenditure for non-military and military
sectors. Following recent developments in Bayesian estimation techniques (see, e.g.,
Geweke (1999) and Schorfheide (2000)), we estimate the model by maximising over
the posterior distribution of the model parameters based on the linearized state-space
representation of the DSGE model.
Our results suggest that whether an increase in government spending or its compo-
nents raises or lowers consumption depends on the interaction of a number of factors.
First, we nd that scal shocks have stronger e¤ects on consumption, wages, interest
rate and ination rate in the earlier period. Second our analysis suggests that most
of the changes in scal policy shocks are accounted for the increased asset market
participation. Moreover, we show that US economy has di¤erent responses for the
increases of non-military and military expenditures. The former has a greater im-
pact than the latter. In this context, the purpose of the estimation in this paper
is twofold. First, it allows us to evaluate the ability of the new generation of new-
Keynesian DSGE models to capture the empirical stochastics and dynamics in the
data. Second, the estimated model is used to analyse the e¤ects of scal shock on
US economy. Our methodology provides a fully structural approach which makes it
easier to identify the various shocks in a theoretically consistent way.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the derivation
of the linearized model. In Section 3.3, we, discuss the estimation methodology and
present the main results. In Section 3.4, we analyse the impulse responses of the
di¤erent scal shocks. Finally, Section 3.5 reviews some of the main conclusions that
we can draw from the analysis and contains suggestions for further work.
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3.2 THE MODEL
In this section we present the DSGE model (see Appendix A for the full derivation)
following the paper of Bilbiie et al. (2009). In particular, we assume an economy
with sticky prices and limited asset market participation. A continuum of households
maximize a utility function with two arguments (consumption and leisure) over an
innite life horizon. Firms produce di¤erentiated goods, decide on labour input and
set price according to the Calvo model. Moreover, a scal policy authority purchases
consumption goods, that are divided in spending for military sector and non-military
sector, and raises lump-sum taxes, income taxes and issues nominal debt. Finally,
the model encompasses a central bank which sets its policy instrument, the nominal
interest rate, by a Taylor rule (1993).
3.2.1 HOUSEHOLDS
Lets assume a continuum of innitely-lived households [0; 1] divided in "asset holders"
and "non-asset holders". Asset holders, denoted with the fraction 1 , trade a risk-
less one period bond and hold shares in rms. Non-asset holders, on the [0; ] interval,
do not participate in asset markets and simply consume their disposable income. The
distinction between households is assumed not to arise from preferences but from
their actual capacity to participate in asset markets (Bilbie et al. 2009). Indeed,
we assume preference homogeneity: the inverse of the Frish elasticity (') and the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution () are the same for both types
of households. This is consistent with the view that the only source of heterogeneity
among households is their access to the asset markets, which can be limited due to
exogenous institutional constraints (Mishkin, 1991).
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ASSET HOLDERS. Let CA;t, LA;t and BA;t+1 denote, respectively, consumption,
leisure and nominal bond holdings for each asset holder on the [; 1] interval. These
households face the following intertemporal problem:
max
fCA;t;LA;t;BA;t+1g
Et
1X
t=o
t

CA;tL
'
A;t
1 
1   (Eq. 1)
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor. We note that the utility function is non
separable in consumption and leisure and belongs to the King-Plosser-Rebelo (1988)
class.
The asset holder intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
R 1t BA;t+1 + PtCA;t + PtTt = BA;t + (1  ) (WtNA;t + PtDA;t) (Eq. 2)
We assume that the income tax rate () is constant, and the real lump-sum taxes
(Tt) are adjusted to a rule specied below. We denote Rt as the gross nominal return
on bonds purchased in period t, whereas Pt is the price level, Wt the nominal wage,
and DA;t represents real dividend payments to households who own shares in the
monopolistically competitive rms. Finally, the hours worked by the asset holder
are denoted by NA;t. We assume that time endowment is normalized to one, thus we
have: NA;t = 1  LA;t.
Combining the First Order Conditions of consumption and nominal bond holdings
we obtain:
R 1t = Et [t;t+1] (Eq. 3)
where t;t+s denotes the stochastic discount factor of asset holders for real s-period
ahead payo¤s:
t;t+s = 
s

CA;t
CA;t+s
 
LA;t+s
LA;t
'(1 )
Pt
Pt+s
(Eq. 4)
The labour decision equation is given by:
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CA;t
LA;t
=
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
(Eq. 5)
NON-ASSET HOLDERS. We denote consumption and hours worked by non-asset
holders, respectively, as CN;t and NN;t. In each period t, these households solve the
following intratemporal problem:
max
fCN;t;LN;tg

CN;tL
'
N;t
1 
1   (Eq. 6)
subject to the following budget constraint:
PtCN;t = (1  )WtNN;t   PtTt (Eq. 7)
According to expression (Eq. 7), non-asset holders consumption equals their net
income.
The rst order condition of this problem is given by:
CN;t
LN;t
=
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
(Eq. 8)
3.2.2 FIRMS
Final good is produced by competitive rms using the aggregation technology of the
CES form:
Yt =
0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
(Eq. 9)
where " denotes the constant elasticity of substitution, whereas Yt (i) indicates the
quantity of intermediate good i 2 [0; 1], at time t, used as input.
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Prot maximization of the nal good rms is given by:
max
fYt(i)g
PtYt  
1Z
0
Pt (i)Yt (i) di
where Pt is the price index for the nal good and Pt (i) denotes the price of the
intermediate good i. From the rst order condition for Yt (i) we obtain the downward
sloping demand for each intermediate input:
Yt (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 "
Yt (Eq. 10)
that implies a price index equal to:
Pt =
24 1Z
0
(Pt (i))
1 "
di
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1
1 "
The intermediate good, Yt (i), is produced by monopolistically competitive pro-
ducers that face a production function that is linear in labour and subject to a xed
cost F :
Yt (i) = Nt (i)  F; if Nt (i) > F; otherwise; Yt (i) = 0 (Eq. 11)
thus, real prots for these rms correspond to:
Ot (i) 

Pt (i)
Pt

Yt (i) 

Wt
Pt

Nt (i)
The intermediate-good rms are subject to Calvo style price-setting frictions
(Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996)). Thus, we assume that intermediate rms can re-
optimize their prices with probability (1  ), whereas with probability  they keep
their prices constant as in a given period. In particular, a rm i, resetting its price
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in period t, solves the following maximization problem:
max
fPt (i)g
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s [P

t (i)Yt;t+s (i) Wt+sYt;t+s (i)]
subject to the demand function:
Yt+s (i) =

P t (i)
Pt+s
 "
Yt+s
where P t (i) is the optimal price chosen by rms resetting prices at time t. Moreover,
we note that in last equation appears t;t+s, i.e. the stochastic discount factor char-
acterizing asset holders, who own the rms. Solving this maximization problem we
obtain the following rst order condition:
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s

P t (i) 
"
"  1Wt+s

= 0 (Eq. 12)
Finally, the expression for price law of motion is equal to:
Pt =
h
 (Pt 1)
1 
+ (1  ) (P t )1 
i 1
1 
(Eq. 13)
3.2.3 FISCAL POLICY
The government purchases consumption goods, raises distortionary () and lump-sum
taxes (Tt), and issues debt (Bt+1), consisting of one-period nominal discount bonds.
Its budget constraint corresponds to the following expression:
R 1t Bt+1 = Bt + Pt [Gt   Yt   Tt] (Eq. 14)
Since our analysis focuses on the impact of public spending on the economy, we dis-
tinguish two di¤erent cases: rst, we analyze the case of total government spending,
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second, we split public expenditure in non-military and military components.
TOTAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING. We assume that total government spending
is one of the exogenous AR(1) processes that drives the economy:
log (Gt) = 
G log (Gt 1) + Gt (Eq. 15)
where: Gt  N
 
0; 2G

where G indicates the persistence of total government spending and Gt is a i.i.d.
distributed error term that captures the shock volatility.
NON-MILITARY AND MILITARY SPENDINGS. According to the additive prin-
ciple, total public expenditure can be seen as the sum of its di¤erent components.
Thus, government spending is divided into civilian sector spending (NMt) and mili-
tary sector spending (Mt):
Gt = NMt +Mt (Eq. 16)
We assume that civilian and military expenditure levels are independent and exoge-
nous AR(1) processes:
log (NMt) = 
NM log (NMt 1) + NMt ; (Eq. 17)
where: NMt  N
 
0; 2NM

log (Mt) = 
M log (Mt 1) + Mt ; (Eq. 18)
where: Mt  N
 
0; 2M

where NM and M are, respectively, the persistence parameters of the civilian and
military shocks, while NMt and Mt are, respectively, the stochastic civilian and mili-
tary terms that are i.i.d. distributed.
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FINANCING MECHANISM OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE. We dene the govern-
ment primary decit as total non-interest spending less the revenues, formally:
Dt = Gt   Yt   Tt (Eq. 19)
Moreover we assume that government incurs to a structural decit (Ds;t), which is
equal to (see Appendix A for details):
Ds;t = Dt +  (Yt   Y ) = Gt   Tt   Y (Eq. 20)
i.e. the primary decit adjusted for automatic responses of tax revenues resulting
from deviations on output from its steady state value (Y ).
3.2.4 MONETARY POLICY
In our baseline model the Central Bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate
every period according the following empirical monetary policy reaction function:
Rt = 
RRt 1 +
 
1  R ft + r (t 1   t) + ry (Yt   Y )g (Eq. 21)
+r (t   t 1) + ry ((Yt   Y )  (Yt 1   Y )) + Rt
where t denotes the ination rate.
The monetary authority follow a generalised Taylor rule by gradually responding
to deviations of lagged ination from an ination objective (normalised to be zero)
and the lagged output gap dened as the di¤erence between actual and steady state
output (Rabanal et. al, 2001). We include an interest rate smoothing parameter, R,
following recent empirical work (as in Clarida et al. (1998)). In addition, there is
also a short-run feedback from the current changes in ination and the output gap.
Finally, we assume that there are two monetary policy shocks: the rst is a
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persistent shock to the ination objective (t) which is assumed to follow a rst
order autoregressive process:
log (t) = 
t log (t 1) + t (Eq. 22)
where : t  N
 
0; 2

The second shock is a temporary i.i.d. normal interest rate shock that will also be
denoted as monetary policy shock:
Rt  N
 
0; 2R

3.2.5 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND AGGREGATION
A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium is a set of values for prices and quantities
such that the representative households and rms optimality conditions, and the
market clearing conditions are satised.
In this case, the nal good market is in equilibrium if production equals demand
by total household consumption and government spending:
Yt = Ct +Gt (Eq. 23)
where aggregate consumption is:
Ct = CN;t + (1  )CA;t (Eq. 24)
The labour market is in equilibrium when the wage level is such that rmsdemand
for labour equals total labour supply:
Nt = NN;t + (1  )NA;t (Eq. 25)
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Finally, the share market is in equilibrium if the households hold all outstanding
equity shares and all government debt be held by asset holders:
Bt+1 = (1  )BA;t+1 (Eq. 26)
3.2.6 THE LINEARIZED MODEL
For the empirical analysis of section 2.3 we linearize the model equations described
above around the non-stochastic steady state (see Appendix B for details). Below
we summarize the resulting linear rational expectations equations. We denote by
small letters the log deviation of a variable from its steady-state value, while for
any variable Xt, X stands for its steady-state value and XY its steady-state share in
output, X=Y .
HOUSEHOLDS. The log-linearized Euler equation for asset-holders (Eq. 3) relates
consumption dynamics with real balances and with hours growth multiplied by steady
state taxes and government spending shares with respect to output:
cA;t = EtcA;t+1   1

(rt   Ett+1) +

1

  1

1 +
TY
1 GY

(EtnA;t+1   nA;t) (Eq. 27)
When  > 1 the elasticity of consumption growth (EtcA;t+1   cA;t) to hours growth
(EtnA;t+1   nA;t) is positive. We note that the elasticity of consumption to the real
interest rate is given by 1=.
The log-linearization of the labour decion equation for asset holders (Eq. 5) is
given by:
N
1 N nA;t = wt   cA;t (Eq. 28)
According to this intratemporal optimality condition, asset holders choose optimally
their labour supply taking wages as given by the rms.
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Similarly, the log-linearized labour decision equation for non-asset holders is ob-
tained from expression (Eq. 8) and is equal to:
N
1 N nN;t = wt   cN;t (Eq. 29)
The consumption for non-asset holders is obtained log-linearizing their budget
constraint (Eq. 7) and is given by:
(1 GY ) cN;t=(1  ) (wt + nN;t) TY tt (Eq. 30)
From the last two relations, we obtain a reduced-form labour supply for non-asset
holders. Specically we have:
nN;t =
'
1 + '
  TY
1 GY + TY

(wt   tt) (Eq. 31)
From this condition, we can observe that, since  TY > 0, hours of non asset holders
respond positively to increases in the real wage, wt, and taxes relative to their steady
state value, TY tt.
We simplify the analysis assuming that steady state labour is the same across
household types, NA = NN = N . Thus, the log-linearized expression for aggregate
hours (Eq. 25) is given by:
nt = nN;t + (1  )nA;t (Eq. 32)
Because of preference homogeneity, the assumption of equal labour levels in the
steady state implies that CA = CN = C (see Appendix B). Thus, the log-linearized
expression for aggregate consumption (Eq. 24) is given by:
ct = cN;t + (1  ) cA;t (Eq. 33)
39
FIRMS. The log-linearized aggregate production function (Eq. 11) is given by:
yt = (1 + FY )nt (Eq. 34)
We note that the share of the xed cost F in steady-state output governs the degree
of increasing returns to scale.
Combining the log-linearized expressions of (Eq. 12) and of price level dynamics
equation (Eq. 13), yields the familiar new-Keynesian Phillips curve:
t = Ett+1 +
(1  ) (1  )

wt (Eq. 35)
We note that current ination depends positively on expected future ination and
on the marginal cost, i.e. the wage rate.
FISCAL POLICY. In both cases of aggregate government spending and disaggre-
gation of non-military and military sectors, the linearization of the budget constraint
(Eq. 14) around a steady state with zero debt and a balanced primary budget gives
the following expression:
b^t+1 = b^t +GY gt   TT tt   yt (Eq. 36)
NON-MILITARY AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES. Distinguishing the dif-
ferent components of public spending gives an additional condition. Indeed, log-
linearized public expenditure composition is obtained from expression (Eq. 16) di-
vided by output:
gtGY = NMY nmt +MYmt (Eq. 37)
We note that total government spending is the sum of civilian and military compo-
nent, respectively weighted by their shares with respect to output.
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FINANCING MECHANISM OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE. The log-linearized
structural primary decit (Eq. 20) is given by:
d^s;t = GY gt   TY tt (Eq. 38)
We assume that the structural decit is adjusted according to the following rule:
d^s;t = d^s;t 1 + gGY gt + bb^t (Eq. 39)
Rules of this type have been studied extensively, including by Bohn (1998) and Galí
and Perotti (2003). The parameter  captures the possibility that budget decisions
are autocorrelated. As regards the parameters g and b they measure the response
of structural decit to changes in government spending and debt, respectively. In
particular, b captures a debt stabilizationmotive, thus a low value implies that
decit is adjusted in order to stabilize outstanding debt.
MONETARY POLICY. The monetary policy rule (Eq. 21) is already linearized:
Rt = RRt 1 + (1  R) ft + r (t 1   t) + ry (Yt   Y )g (Eq. 40)
+r (t   t 1) + ry ((Yt   Y )  (Yt 1   Y )) + Rt
MARKET CLEARING CONDITION. The log-linearized good market clearing con-
dition (Eq. 23) can be written as:
yt = gtGY + ct (1 GY ) (Eq. 41)
Our aim is to analyze the stochastic behaviour of the system of linear rational ex-
pectations equations. According to the di¤erent modelling of scal sector, we dis-
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tinguish two models: rst we assume that the whole economy is driven by three
exogenous shock variables: one arising from total government spending
 
Gt

and two
from monetary policy
 
t ; 
R
t

. The second case corresponds to the disaggregation
of total public spending into non-military and military sectors. In this context, the
exogenous processes governing the economy are four: two coming from non-military
and military spending components
 
NMt ; 
M
t

and two from monetary policy
 
t ; 
R
t

.
As discussed above, all the shock variables are assumed to follow an independent
rst-order autoregressive stochastic process, except from the interest rate shock that
is assumed to be i.i.d. independent process.
3.3 ESTIMATION RESULTS
In this section we, rst, describe the data used in order to assess the theoretical
model. Secondly, we discuss how we estimate the structural parameters and the
processes governing the structural shocks. Finally, we present the main estimation
results.
3.3.1 DATA DESCRIPTION
We concentrate on U.S. data for two samples 1954:31979:2 (S1) and 1983:12008:2
(S2). This choice reects the hypothesis of a structural break in the early 1980s.
Thus, we follow the assumption that the e¤ects of scal shocks changed substantially
in the early 1980s as a consequence of the nancial liberalization occurring in that
period, as argued by Bilbiie et al (2009). We assume that the investigator observes the
ination rate, the short-term nominal interest rate, total government spending, non-
military and military expenditures. The ination rate corresponds to the quarterly
growth rate of the GDP price index. For the short-term nominal interest rate we
consider the e¤ective federal funds rate expressed in quarterly terms (averages of
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monthly values, in percentage terms). The source of these data is the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louiswebsite.
Figure 1: Interest Rate, Ination rate, Total Government,
Non-Military and Military Expenditures.
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As regards total government spending and expenditures for non-military and mil-
itary sectors, we collect data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Eco-
nomic Accounts. Military spending corresponds to national defence data, whereas
non-military spending is obtained from the di¤erence between government consump-
tion expenditures and gross investment data and national defence data. These vari-
ables are deated by respective deators and are expressed in log per capita terms.
Despite these transformations, some series still display an upward trend. Thus, we
separately eliminate it from their log using a Hodrick-Prescott lter, as in Canova
et al. (2010) and Castelnuovo (2010). While the resulting uctuations display long
period of oscillation, they are overall stationary as the model assumes (see Figure 1).
3.3.2 ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
Geweke (1999) distinguishes between weak and strong econometric approaches in
order to estimate the parameters of a linearized DSGE model. Smets and Wouters
(2003) argue that the weak interpretation is closest in spirit to the original RBC
programme developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982, 1996). The parameters of a
DSGE model are calibrated in such a way that selected theoretical moments given
by the model match as closely as possible those observed in the data. One way
of achieving this, is by minimising some distance function between the theoretical
and empirical moments of interest. Among the others Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) have estimated the parameters in
monetary DSGE models by minimising the di¤erence between an empirical and the
theoretical impulse response to a monetary policy shock.
In contrast, as observed by Smets and Wouters (2003), the strong econometric
interpretation attempts to provide a full characterisation of the observed data se-
ries. Among the others, Sargent (1989) has estimated the structural parameters of
his DSGE model using classical maximum likelihood methods12. These maximum
12See the references in Ireland (1999).
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likelihood methods usually consist of four steps. In the rst step, the linear rational
expectations model is solved for the reduced form state equation in its predeter-
mined variables. In the second step, the model is written in its state space form.
This involves augmenting the state equation in the predetermined variables with
an observation equation which links the predetermined state variables to observable
variables. In this step, the researcher also needs to take a stand on the form of the
measurement error that enters the observation equations13. The third step consists
of using the Kalman lter to form the likelihood function. In the nal step, the
parameters are estimated by maximising the likelihood function.
Alternatively within this strong interpretation, Smets and Wouters (2003) show a
Bayesian approach combining the likelihood function with prior distributions for the
parameters of the model, to form the posterior density function. This posterior is
optimised with respect to the model parameters through Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain
(MCMC) sampling methods.
According to Smets and Wouters (2003), the attractions of the strong econometric
interpretation are clear. When successful, it provides a full characterisation of the
data generating process and allows for proper specication testing and forecasting.
In particular, its attractiveness arises from three reasons. First, the dynamics of var-
ious DSGE models are able to match not only the contemporaneous correlations in
the observed data series, but also the serial correlation and cross-covariances. More-
over, if one allows for a su¢ ciently rich stochastic structure, the singularity problem
can be avoided and a better characterisation of the unconditional moments in the
data is achieved. Second, as pointed out by Geweke (1999), the weak econometric
interpretation of DSGE models is not necessarily less stringent than the strong inter-
pretation: in spite of the focus on a restricted set of moments, the model is assumed
to account for all aspects of the observed data series and these aspects are used in
13 Ireland (1999) has suggested a way of combining the power of DSGE theory with the exibility of vector au-
toregressive time-series models by proposing to model the residuals in the observation equations (which capture the
movements in the data that the theory cannot explain) as a general VAR process.
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calculating the moments of interest. Third, computational methods have improved
so that relatively large models can be solved quite e¢ ciently.
In this paper, we follow the strong econometric interpretation of DSGE models.
In particular we follow the same estimation methodology used by Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2007). As in papers by Geweke (1998), Landon-Lane (2000), Otrok (2001),
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2001) and Schorfheide (2000), we apply
Bayesian techniques for two reasons. First, this approach allows one to formalise the
use of prior information coming either from micro-econometric studies or previous
macro-econometric studies and thereby makes an explicit link with the previous
calibration-based literature. Second, from a practical point of view, the use of prior
distributions over the structural parameters makes the highly non-linear optimisation
algorithm more stable.
In order to estimate the parameters of the DSGE model presented in Section
3.2 we proceeded with the following steps. First, we estimated the mean of the
posterior distribution by maximising the log posterior function, which combines the
prior information on the parameters with the likelihood of the data. In a second
step, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm was used to get a complete picture of the
posterior distribution and to evaluate the marginal likelihood of the model14.
3.3.3 PRIOR DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARAMETERS
Before discussing the estimation results we rst discuss the choice of the prior distri-
butions. In that regard we distinguish two groups of parameters. The rst group is
kept as xed and these parameters can be viewed as a very strict prior because they
can be directly related to the steady-state values and are not identiable from the
data we use. For these values we follow the parameterization of Galí et al. (2007)
and Bilbiie et al. (2009). Table 1 and 2 display the choice of xed parameters in the
14See Smets and Wouters (2003) for a more elaborate description of the methodology. All the estimations are done
with Dynare (http://www.cpremap.cnrs.fr/dynare).
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two sub samples for aggregate government spending model and disaggregate public
expenditure components model, respectively.
As we can note from Table 1, the share of government expenditure in GDP (GY )
in S1 (0:28) is higher than the one in S2 (0:18). This innocuous assumption reects
that fact that average of public spending decreased during the period considered. In
addition, in the case of disaggregation between public components, Table 2 shows
the share of spending in GDP for non-military sector (NMY ) and military sector
(MY ) in S1 and S2. Also in this case we assume that the non-military and military
expenditures as share of GDP decreased, respectively from 0:18 to 0:12 and from 0:10
to 0:06.
Table 1: Fixed Parameters for the Model
with Total Government Spending
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Table 2: Fixed Parameters for the Model
with Non-Military and Military Expenditures
For the remaining xed parameters we use same values for both sub samples and
in both the models (see Tables 1-2). The discount factor () is calibrated to be 0:99,
which implies an annual steady state real interest rate of 4%. The steady state tax
rate () is set to 0:3. Together with the assumption that the steady-state share of
debt is zero, these parameters pin down lump-sum transfers in steady state. The
elasticity of substitution (") is chosen such that the mark-up in steady state equals
20%. Moreover, we assume that, in steady state, agents spend one-fourth of their time
endowment working. We x , the probability that prices are not changed in a given
period, at 0:75, a value in the middle of the range reported for di¤erent specications
by Galí and Gertler (1999), who apply single equation estimation techniques to the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Lastly, we assume a conventional value of 2 for the
inverse of the elasticity of substitution, as in Bilbiie et al. (2009).
The second group of parameters are estimated using the Bayesian method. Table
3-4 show the priors of the stochastic processes in the model with aggregate govern-
ment spending and in the model with non-military/military expenditures, respec-
tively. Since the main objective of the paper is to compare the e¤ects of the di¤erent
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shocks on the scal side, we choose to take same prior distributions for monetary
policy parameters in both sub samples and for both the models. As well as, in order
to compare coherently the estimated results, we choose the general assumption that
the priors for decit rule parameters are the same in both sub samples and for both
the models.
In particular, standard errors of the innovations are assumed to follow an inverse-
gamma distribution with two degrees of freedom for both models (see Tables 3-4),
which corresponds to a rather loose prior (as argued by Smets and Wouters, 2003).
After the inspection analysis of the observed time series, we choose mean values
of the stochastic processes that are slightly higher than the ones set by Smets and
Wouters (2007). For aggregate government spending model (Table 3), we x the
mean of the scal shock equal to 0:4, whereas monetary shocksmeans are assumed
equal to 0:2. In the case of disaggregate public spending components (Table 4) we
choose both the means for non-military and military shocks equal to 0:4, whereas
for both ination objective and interest rate shocks equal to 0:2. In both models
(Table 3-4) the persistence of the AR(1) processes is beta distributed as in Smets and
Wouters (2007). We x the prior standard deviation of these parameters equal to
0:1. In the case of total government spending (Table 3), the mean of the scal shock
persistence is set equal to 0:25, whereas for both monetary policy shocks equal to
0:65. In the case non-military and military model (Table 4), we x M , t and R all
equal to 0:65, except for NM that is equal to 0:25.
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Table 3: Priors and Posteriors of Shock Processes
for the Model with Total Government Spending
Note: The posterior distributions is obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
Table 4: Priors and Posteriors of Shock Processes
for the Model with Non-Military and Military Expenditures
Note: The posterior distributions is obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
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Tables 5-6 display the prior distributions of the other eight estimated parameters
for both S1 and S2 in both the model with total public spending and the model with
disaggregate government components. As before, these prior distributions are the
same in S1 and S2. In addition, we assume that this group of priors is identical in
both models. We begin describing scal policy parameters. We choose that b and
g are both gamma distributed with standard error equal to 0:1 and mean 0:3. Both
these mean values are within the range of estimated parameters reported in Galí
et al. (2007). The parameter  captures the possibility that budget decisions are
autocorrelated. We impose it to be gamma distributed with mean 0:5 and standard
error equal to 0:1. The mean value of this parameter is in line with Bilbiie et al.
(2009).
The parameters describing the monetary policy rule are based on a standard
Taylor rule and in line with the values of Smets and Wouters (2007). In particular,
we choose the short and long term coe¢ cients on ination as normal distributed with
standard errors equal to 0:1. Prior mean of r is set equal to 1:5 in order to guarantee
a unique solution path when solving the model, as stated by Smets and Wouters
(2003). The prior of the short and long term coe¢ cients on output are gamma
distributed with means equal to 0:05 and 0:1, respectively, and standard errors equal
to 0:05 for both parameters.
Finally, we focus on the share of non-asset holders, i.e. . As we discuss below,
this parameter is crucial for the crowding in/out e¤ects of total public spending and
its di¤erent components on private consumption. Here, we follow seminal papers of
Galí et al. (2007) and Mankiw (2000) assuming their same mean value. Thus, we
choose that  has a gamma prior distribution with mean 0:5 and standard error 0:1.
3.3.4 POSTERIOR ESTIMATES OF THE PARAMETERS
Tables 3-6 show also the results of the parameter estimates in the two sub sam-
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ples for the model with aggregate government spending and the model with non-
military/military expenditures model. In particular, we report the mean, and the
5 and the 95 percentiles of the posterior distribution for parameters obtained through
theMetropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm15. The latter is based on 100,000 draws16.
A number of observations are worth making with regard to the estimated processes
for the exogenous shock variables. First, it appears that the data are quite informa-
tive as indicated by the lower variance of the posterior distributions relative to the
prior distributions. In the model with aggregate government spending (Table 3) we
nd that the scal shock volatility (G) is 0:59 in S1 and 0:37 in S2. Interestingly,
these estimates are very close to those reported by Smets and Wouters (2007) in
their sub samples (1966:1-1979:2 - 1984:1-2004:4). Fiscal shock persistence is higher
in S1 than in S2. Also this result is line with Smets and Wouters (2007).
Table 5: Priors and Posteriors of Structural Parameters
for the Model with Total Government Spending
Note: The posterior distributions is obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
15See Landon-Lane (1998) and Otrok (2001) for earlier applications of the MH algorithm to DSGE models and
Geweke (1998) for a discussion of the various sampling algorithms.
16A sample of 100,000 draws was su¢ cient to ensure the convergence of the MH sampling algorithm (see Smets
and Wouters, 2003).
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Table 6: Priors and Posteriors of Structural Parameters
for the Model with Non-Military and Military Expenditures
Note: The posterior distributions is obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
As concerns monetary policy, we nd that a more active monetary authority in
S2 with respect to S1. These estimates conrms the results of Boivin and Giannoni
(2006), which nd that a stronger central bank response to ination in the second
sub period can account for a smaller output response to monetary policy shocks
estimated in identied VARs.
Now, we turn to estimated results for the exogenous shocks in the model with
non-military and military expenditure (Table 4). The most remarkable di¤erences
are both the volatility and the persistence of these two public spending components.
Indeed, M is around the double of NM in both S1 (1:0 against 0:6) and S2 (0:8
against 0:4). This conrms that military spending shocks have a greater impact on
the economy. Also the persistence of military expenditure shock is higher than the
one of civilian spending shock (in S1, 0:8 and 0:4, respectively, whereas in S2, 0:7 and
0:6, respectively). Interestingly, we note that the persistence of non-military shock
increased in the second sub sample. This can be explained by the rise of the resources
devolved to civilian sector with respect to military sector.
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The estimates of scal policy parameters are very similar for the model with total
government spending and the model with non military/military expenditures (rst
three lines of Tables 5-6). First, we note that the estimates for b of 0:30 in both
samples S1 and S2 are in the range of the ones reported by Galí et al. (2007). As
Bilbiie et al. (2009) argue these values imply a tendency toward debt stabilization:
in both samples, in response to a higher level of debt the structural decit is reduced.
The second scal policy parameter, g, indicates the response of structural decit
to changes in government spending. Again, we observe a substantial identical value
across samples of 0:30, as found by Galí et al. (2007). Bilbiie et al. (2009) observes
that this value suggests a great reliance on decits to nance an extra spending
unit. As concerns the autoregressive parameter  is estimated 0:5 in both S1 and S2,
implying great persistence of decits in both sub samples. These values are in line
with the ones reported by Bilbiie et al. (2009).
Estimated parameters for monetary policy are shown in the last rows of Tables
5-6. We obtain the same the results both for the model with aggregate government
spending and for the model with non-military/military expenditures. First, we note
a high value for the long run response of interest rate to ination. Indeed, the
parameter r is estimated at 1:5 both in S1 and in S2. These estimates are fairly
close to those reported by Smets and Wouters (2007). The long run response of
interest rate to output gap decreases from around 0:10 in S1 to 0:07 in S2. Similar
values were found by Smets and Wouters (2007).
Finally, we analyze the results concerning the parameter indicating the share
of non-asset holders, i.e. . First, we note that asset market participation di¤ers
considerably across periods. Specically, for the model with aggregate government
spending, the share of consumers who do not smooth consumption by trading in
assets is estimated at 0:43 in S1 and at 0:27 in S2. As concerns the model with
disaggregate public spending components  = 0:43 in S1 and  = 0:34 in S2. These
results are perfectly in line with the ones reported by Bilbiie et al. (2009) and imply
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that access to asset markets widened with the important institutional changes in the
early 1980s. As discussed by Mishkin (1991), nancial liberalization was caused by
Regulation Q,which imposed tight restrictions on the interest paid by commercial
banks; a reduced minimum denomination of Treasury bills; the emergence of money
market mutual funds; a sharp decrease in trading costs; and a rise in private share-
holding. As we discussed above, scal policy shocks changed before and after this
period.
3.4 ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL SHOCKS ON THE ECON-
OMY
In this Section we use the estimated DSGE model to analyse the impulse responses
of the scal structural shocks. We rst describe the results of the model concerning
total government spending. Successively, we turn to discuss the e¤ects in the model
with the disaggregation of public spending into non-military and military sectors.
3.4.1 MODEL WITH AGGREGATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses to a positive government spending shock with
the 5 and 95 percentiles. The variable responses are expressed as shares of aggregate
public spending by multiplying the response from the Bayesian estimates (which are
expressed in logs) by the respective sub sample average share of total government
expenditure in GDP (as in Monacelli and Perotti, 2006). The rst row depicts the
response of consumption. As we can note, the patterns conrm the earlier ndings of
Mihov (2003) and Perotti (2005) regarding a weaker response of private consumption
in S2 relative to S1. The response of the real wage is reported in the second row.
Here, we observe a much higher increase in the rst sample with respect to second
one. This pattern is in line with other studies that cover the same sample period, as
Galí et al. (2007) and Bilbiie et al. (2009). In the third row, the response of nominal
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interest rate can be seen to display a higher magnitude in S1 than in S2. The last
set of panels pertains to the response of ination rate. The price level seems to rise
more consistently in S1 than in S2.
Our results are in line with theoretical explanations stated by Galí et al. (2007)
and Bilbiie et al. (2009). In particular, the essential condition for the crowding-in of
private consumption (i.e. an increase in consumption in response to a rise in govern-
ment spending) is a strong enough rise in the real wage. Indeed, a higher real wage
induces an increase in the consumption of non-asset holders, which may eventually
more than o¤set the fall in consumption of asset holders. It is straightforward that
labour demand and supply determine the response of real wage. It is also well known
that a positive government spending shock increases the demand for goods. In our
case, prices are not exible because we are in the presence of sticky prices à la Calvo.
This has an e¤ect on labour demand: rms that cannot change their price will adjust
quantities, hence shifting labour demand at a given wage, whereas the rest of the
rms will increase their prices, creating ination.
Meanwhile, labour supply shifts for two di¤erent reasons. First, non-asset holders
will to work more as tax burden increases (the so-called wealth e¤ect). This change
is mitigated by decit-nancing of public expenditure because the taxation dynamics
matters for non-asset holders. Second, asset holders also increase labour supply for a
given wage: this is due both to wealth e¤ect and to intertemporal substitution. The
latter e¤ect occurs if an increase in ination causes a rise in the real interest rate,
thus providing incentives for asset holders to postpone consumption. When the shift
in labour demand dominates the shift in labour supply, the real wage may increase
enough to raise aggregate consumption.
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Figure 2: Total Government Spending Impulse Responses
Finally, it is important to note that we assumed the case in which utility is non
separable ( 6= 1). Specically, since  = 2, hours and consumption will co-move
positively: thus, for a given increase in the real wage, asset holders substitute out of
leisure into consumption. Thus, the negative wealth e¤ect that induces an increase in
hours worked can also induce an increase in consumption. Moreover,  = 2 implies a
lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution. As a result, asset holders have weaker
incentives to postpone consumption for a given increase in real interest rate.
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3.4.2 MODEL WITH NON-MILITARY AND MILITARY SPENDING COMPO-
NENTS
Figures 3-4 show the responses of the variables, with the 5 and 95 percentiles, to
non-military and military spending shocks, respectively. As before, the variable
responses are expressed as shares of non-military (military) spending by multiplying
the response from the Bayesian estimates by the respective sub sample average share
of non-military (military) expenditure in GDP.
Figure 3: Non-Military Spending Impulse Responses
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First, we note a substantial change in the e¤ects of both non-military and mil-
itary spending shocks from S1 to S2. In particular, we note that the responses of
consumption (rst rows of Figures 3-4) are lower in the post-1980 sample. Likewise,
we observe that the rise in real wages is double in S1 with respect to S2 (second rows
of Figures 3-4). From third rows of Figures 3-4, it is evident that interest rate itself
also shows much higher increase in S1. Lastly, the responses of ination rate indicate
a more intense e¤ect of non-military and military spending shocks in S1 (fourth rows
of Figures 3-4).
It is interesting to distinguish the e¤ects of an increase in non-military spending
with respect to a rise of military expenditure. The response of private consump-
tion can be seen to display a more positive e¤ect in the case of a rise non-military
spending. At the contrary, in the case of an increase in military expenditure, private
consumption is negative for rst few periods. The same is true for the real wage
response to civilian and military shocks. An increase of the resources devolved to
non-military sector raises the wage level more than an increase in military spend-
ing. Also for the interest rate response, di¤erences in the e¤ects of non-military and
military shocks are remarkable. In the former case, nominal interest rate displays a
higher increase. Finally, the shock to non-military spending shows a much greater
response of ination rate than the shock to military expenditure.
From these empirical results, it is evident that civilian spending as well as military
spending generate crowding-in e¤ect on private consumption for US economy. On
the other hand, answering the question whether defence spending provides the same
economic stimulation of civilian spending is more complex. Although we obtain
a positive impact of defence spending on consumption, wages, interest rate and
ination rate, the dimensions of the e¤ect in both sub samples are quite weak. Even
if the estimated dimension of the impact might be surprising for some, these estimates
are highly in line with the descriptive evidence of the time series. In conclusion, the
long-run policy mechanism at work seems, therefore, to structurally sustain greater
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returns from civilian spending.
Figure 4: Military Spending Impulse Responses
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we add essentially three contributions to previous literature. First, we
assess what is the impact of an increase in total public spending and its components,
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i.e. the expenditure devolved for non-military and military sectors. Second, we
conrm the emerging evidence that scal shocks in the U.S. economy has changed
substantially in the post-1980s. Finally, we try to account for these changes by
considering a DSGE model estimated with recent Bayesian technique. Estimates of
the parameters with Bayesian approach o¤ers an e¤ective tool in order assess the
impact of exogenous shocks. Indeed, our new-Keynesian model is able to t the
changes in scal policies of U.S. economy very well.
The rst nding is that an exogenous increase in total government spending leads
to a sustained rise in consumption and the real wage in the period 1954-1979 but has
less important e¤ects on these variables after 1982. Moreover, we nd a much larger
positive e¤ect of non-military spending on the economy with respect to the rise of
resources devolved to military sector.
Why does U.S. scal policy have less expansionary e¤ects in the more recent
period? Starting from Bayesian estimates of the structural parameters, we try to
relate the di¤erences in scal shocks transmission to important institutional changes
in the U.S. economy. Specically, we propose a New Keynesian DSGE model that
features limited asset market participation as a potential institutional explanation
for di¤erent degrees of scal policy e¤ectiveness.
We use the same Bayesian approach Smets and Wouters (2007) combining the
likelihood function with prior distributions for the parameters of the model, to form
the posterior density function. This posterior is optimised with respect to the model
parameters through Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) sampling methods. The
attraction of this method is evident. When successful, it provides a full characterisa-
tion of the data generating process and allows for proper specication testing. The
results suggest that asset market participation increased noticeably in the post-1980s,
in line with earlier evidence. A ceteris paribus increase in asset market participation
to the level estimated for the second sample leads to somewhat weaker consumption,
and real wage e¤ects of a scal spending shocks, thus explaining part of the decline
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in the impact of scal shocks. Moreover, our results provide consistent evidence
that defence spending has weaker e¤ects on consumption and wages with respect to
civilian spending. Thus, the military Keynesianism hypothesis that has many sup-
porters/proponents in the U.S. can be questionable. For both the sub-samples, the
dimensions of the e¤ect of defence spending on private consumption, wage, interest
rate and ination rate are really low. On the other hand, economy seems to have
greater returns from non-military spending. The policy implication we draw is that
switching government priorities in favour of supplying civilian goods and services,
rather than nancing federal defence spending, should create benets to the economy.
As future work it would be interesting to analyze the crowding in/out e¤ects of
scal expenditure on aggregate consumption considering the "within" substitution
for the resources devolved to military and non-military sectors. It should be inter-
esting to assess the existence of an indirect and contrasting channel for the e¤ects of
specic government components of expenditure on private consumption. This should
allow us to explain the reasons of crowding in/out e¤ects in the economy.
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3.6 APPENDIX A: MAXIMIZATION PROBLEMS OF THE MODEL
3.6.1 ASSET HOLDERS.
This kind of households solves the following intertemporal problem:
max
fCA;t;LA;t;BA;t+1g
Et
1X
t=o
t

CA;tL
'
A;t
1 
1   (Eq. A1)
subject to the budget constraint:
R 1t BA;t+1 + PtCA;t + PtTt = BA;t + (1  ) (WtNA;t + PtDA;t) (Eq. A2)
We can write the lagrangian of this problem as:
L = Et
8><>:
1X
t=o
t
264

CA;tL
'
A;t
1 
1  
375+ t
264 1RtBA;t+1 + PtCA;t+
PtTt  BA;t   (1  ) (Wt (1  LA;t) + PtDA;t)
375
9>=>;
The rst order conditions for CA;t and LA;t are:
@L
@CA;t
= 0)
t

CA;tL
'
A;t
 
L'A;t + 
ttPt = 0)
t =  
L'A;t
CA;tL
'
A;t
 1Pt (Eq. A3)
@L
@LA;t
= 0)
t

CA;tL
'
A;t
 
CA;t'L
' 1
A;t + 
tt [  (1  ) ( Wt)] = 0)
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'CA;tL
' 1
A;t
CA;tL
'
A;t
 =  t [(1  )Wt] (Eq. A4)
putting (Eq. A3) into (Eq. A4) we obtain the labour decision equation:
'CA;tL
' 1
A;t
CA;tL
'
A;t
 = L'A;t
CA;tL
'
A;t
 1Pt [(1  )Wt])
CA;t
LA;t
=
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
The FOC for BA;t+1 is:
@L
@BA;t+1
= 0)
t
t 1
Rt
+ t+1
t+1 ( 1) = 0)
t
1
Rt
= t+1 (Eq. A5)
putting (Eq. A3) into (Eq. A5) we obtain the Euler equation:
  L
'
A;t+1
CA;tL
'
A;t
 1Pt 1Rt =   L
'
A;t+1
CA;t+1L
'
A;t+1
  )
1
Rt
= 

CA;t
CA;t+1
 
LA;t+1
LA;t
'(1 )
Pt
Pt+1
thus:
R 1t = Et [t;t+1]
where:
t;t+s = 
s

CA;t
CA;t+s
 
LA;t+s
LA;s
'(1 )
Pt
Pt+s
this is the stochastic discount factor.
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3.6.2 NON-ASSET HOLDERS.
Non-asset holders solve the intratemporal problem:
max
fCN;t;LN;tg

CN;tL
'
N;t
1 
1   (Eq. A6)
subject to:
PtCN;t = (1  )WtNN;t   PtTt (Eq. A7)
The lagrangian associated to this problem is:
L =

CN;tL
'
N;t
1 
1   + t [PtCN;t   (1  )Wt (1  LN;t)  PtTt]
the rst order conditions for CN;t and LN;t are:
@L
CN;t
= 0)

CN;tL
'
N;t
 
L'N;t + tPt = 0)
t =
L'N;t
CN;tL
'
N;t
 1Pt (Eq. A8)
@L
LN;t
= 0)

CN;tL
'
N;t
 
'CN;tL
' 1
N;t + t [(1  )Wt ( 1)] = 0)
'CN;tL
' 1
N;t
CN;tL
'
N;t
 = t [(1  )Wt] (Eq. A9)
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putting (Eq. A8) into (Eq. A9) gives the labour decision equation:
'CN;tL
' 1
N;t
CN;tL
'
N;t
 =   L'N;t
CN;tL
'
N;t
 1Pt [(1  )Wt])
CN;t
LN;t
=
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
3.6.3 FINAL GOOD FIRMS.
Given the following aggregation technology:
Yt =
0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
(Eq. A10)
the nal good rm maximizes its prots as:
max
fYt(i)g
PtYt  
1Z
0
Pt (i)Yt (i) di (Eq. A11)
Putting equation (Eq. A10) into (Eq. A11) we have:
max
Yt(i)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
 
1Z
0
Pt (i)Yt (i) di
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thus, we obtain the demand for each intermediate input:
Pt
"
"  1
0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1 1
"  1
"
Yt (i)
" 1
"  1   Pt (i) = 0)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1 1
Yt (i)
" 1
"  1   Pt (i) = 0)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1 1
Yt (i)
" 1
"  1 = Pt (i))
Yt (i)
  1" =
Pt (i)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A 
1
" 1
)
Yt (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 "0@ 1Z
0
Yt (i)
" 1
" di
1A
"
" 1
)
Yt (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 "
Yt (Eq. A12)
Putting (Eq. A12) into (Eq. A10) we obtain the price index:
Yt =
0@ 1Z
0
 
Pt (i)
Pt
 "! " 1"
Y
" 1
"
t di
1A
"
" 1
)
Y
" 1
"
t = Y
" 1
"
t
1Z
0

Pt (i)
Pt
1 "
di)
1 = P
1
1 "
t
1Z
0
(Pt (i))
1 "
di)
P 1 "t =
1Z
0
(Pt (i))
1 "
di)
Pt =
24 1Z
0
(Pt (i))
1 "
di
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1
1 "
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3.6.4 INTERMEDIATE GOOD FIRMS.
Given the following production function:
Yt (i) = Nt (i)  F;
we can write real prots as:
Ot (i) 

Pt (i)
Pt

Yt (i) 

Wt
Pt

Nt (i)
A rm i sets P (i) in order to solve the following problem:
max
fPt (i)g
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s [P

t (i)Yt;t+s (i) Wt+sYt;t+s (i)]
s:t : Yt (i) =

P t (i)
Pt
 "
Yt
that is:
max
fPt (i)g
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s
"
P t (i)

P t (i)
Pt
 "
Yt  Wt

P t (i)
Pt
 "
Yt
#
The FOC is the following:
(1  ") (P

t (i))
 "
P "t
Yt +Wt"

P t (i)
Pt
 " 1
1
Pt
Yt = 0)
(1  ") (P

t (i))
 "
P "t
Yt +Wt"
(P t (i))
 " 1
P " 1t
1
Pt
Yt = 0)
(1  ") (P

t (i))
 "
P "t
+Wt"
(P t (i))
 " 1
P "t
= 0)
(1  ") (P t (i)) " + "Wt (P t (i)) " 1 = 0)
(P t (i))
 "
+
"
1  "Wt (P

t (i))
 " 1
= 0)
(P t (i))
"+1
(P t (i))
 "
+
"
1  "Wt (P

t (i))
 " 1
(P t (i))
"+1
= 0)
P t (i) +
"
1  "Wt = 0)
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thus, we have:
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s

P t (i) 
"
"  1Wt+s

= 0
3.6.5 FISCAL POLICY
The structural decit (Ds;t) can be obtained as follows:
Ds;t = Dt +  (Yt   Y )
= Dt + Yt   Y
= Gt   Yt   Tt + Yt   Y
= Gt   Tt   Y
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3.7 APPENDIX B: STEADY STATES AND LOG-LINEARIZED EQUA-
TIONS
3.7.1 STEADY STATES.
Euler equation (Eq. 3), in steady state, gives:
1
Rt
= 

CA;t
CA;t+1
 
LA;t+1
LA;t
'(1 )
Pt
Pt+1
)
1
R
= 

CA
CA
 
LA
LA
'(1 )
P
P
)
1
R
=  )
R =
1

From the dynamics of the price level (Eq. 13):
Pt =
h
P 1 t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 
i 1
1 
we have that in steady state:
P =
h
P 1  + (1  ) (P )1 
i 1
1  )
P 1  = P 1  + (1  ) (P )1  )
P 1  (1  ) = (1  ) (P )1  )
P = P 
In steady state, from the FOC of the price setting in the intermediate good rms
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problem (Eq. 12), we have for the real wage:
P   "
"  1W = 0)
P =
"
"  1W )
W
P
=
"  1
"
(Eq. A13)
In steady state, from the production function (Eq. 11):
Yt (i) = Nt (i)  F )
Y = N   F
Dening:
 =
1
"  1 )
1 +  = 1 +
1
"  1 =
"  1 + 1
"  1 =
P
W
we can rewrite (Eq. A13) as:
W
P
=
1
1 + 
=
N
N
1
1 + 
=
Y + F
N (1 + )
=
Y
N
1 + FY
1 + 
(Eq. A14)
Prots in steady state amount to:
Ot (i) 

Pt (i)
Pt

Yt (i) 

Wt
Pt

Nt (i))
O 

P
P

Y  

W
P

N )
O  Y  

W
P

N
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so that the ratio of prots to output is given by:
O  Y  

W
P

N )
O  Y  

Y
N
1 + FY
1 + 

N )
OY  1 

1 + FY
1 + 

)
OY  1 +   1  FY
1 + 
)
OY    FY
1 + 
We assume, in steady state, that:
NN = NA = N
because of preference homogeneity, we need to ensure that steady-state consumption
shares also equal across groups. This can be seen comparing the two labour decision
equations (Eq. 5) and (Eq. 8) evaluated in steady state:
CA
L
=
1  
'
W
P
=
CN
L
implying:
CA = CN = C
We know from (Eq. A14) that:
W
P
=
Y
N
1 + FY
1 + 
)
W
P
N
Y
=
1 + FY
1 + 
)
(1  ) W
P
N
Y
= (1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
(Eq. A15)
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From equation (Eq. 7) in steady state:
PtCN;t = (1  )WtNN;t   PtTt )
PCN = (1  )WNN   PT )
CN = (1  ) W
P
NN   T )
CN = (1  ) Y
N
1 + FY
1 + 
NN   T )
CN
Y
=
1
Y
(1  )Y 1 + FY
1 + 
  TY )
CN
Y
= (1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
  TY (Eq. A16)
From expression (Eq. 19) in steady state:
Dt = Gt   Yt   Tt )
0 = G  Y   T )
0 = GY      TY )
TY = GY    (Eq. A17)
From equation (Eq. 24) in steady state:
Ct = CN;t + (1  )CA;t )
C = CN + (1  )CA )
CA =
C   CN
1  
and thus:
CA
Y
=
C   CN
(1  )Y
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since steady state of expression (Eq. 23) gives:
Y = C +G)
1 =
C
Y
+
G
Y
)
C
Y
= 1 GY
and from (Eq. A16):
CN
Y
= (1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
  TY
we have that:
CA
Y
=
1
1  

C
Y
  CN
Y

)
CA
Y
=
1
1  

1 GY    (1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
+ TY

using (Eq. A17):
TY = GY    )
GY = TY + 
we get:
CA
Y
=
1
1  

1  TY       (1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
+ TY

)
CA
Y
=
1
1  

1      (1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
  (1  )TY

)
CA
Y
=
1
1  

1      (1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 

  TY )
CA
Y
=
1
1  

(1  )

1  1 + FY
1 + 

  TY )
CA
Y
= (1  ) 1
1  

1  1 + FY
1 + 

  TY (Eq. A18)
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We thus achieve equalization of steady-state consumption shares by making assump-
tion on technology. Specically, we ensure that asset income in steady state is zero.
This requires assuming that the xed cost of production is characterized by:
FY = 
Substituting in (Eq. A18) gives:
CA
Y
=
CN
Y
= 1     TY = 1 GY
We want to nd hours in steady state. Given the equalization of hours and
consumption between the two groups and normalizing P = 1, the labour decision
equation of non-asset holders (Eq. 8) implies:
CN;t
LN;t
=
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
)
C
L
=
(1  )
'
W )
C
1 N =
(1  )
'
W )
C =
(1  )
'
W (1 N) (Eq. A19)
but from equation (Eq. 7) we have that:
PtCN;t = (1  )WtNN;t   PtTt )
PCN = (1  )WNN   PT )
CN = (1  ) W
P
NN   T )
C = (1  )WN   T (Eq. A20)
75
putting equation (Eq. A20) into equation (Eq. A19) we get:
(1  )WN   T = (1  )
'
W (1 N)
dividing by Y and using (Eq. A15) and the expression for the xed cost we obtain
the following expression for the steady state hours:
(1  )WN   T = (1  )
'
W (1 N))
(1  ) W
P
N
Y
  T
Y
1
P
=
(1  )
'
W
P
(1 N) 1
Y
)
(1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
  TY = (1  )
'
Y
N
1 + FY
1 + 
(1 N) 1
Y
)
(1  ) 1 + FY
1 + 
  TY = (1  )
'
1 N
N
1 + FY
1 + 
)
1  1 + 
1 + FY
TY
1   =
1
'
1 N
N
)
1  TY
1   =
1
'
1 N
N
)
1  GY   
1  

' =
1 N
N
)
1    GY + 
1  

' =
1 N
N
)
1 GY
1   ' =
1 N
N
)
N
1 N =
1
'
1  
1 GY (Eq. A21)
3.7.2 LOG-LINEARIZED EQUATIONS
We obtain expression (Eq. 27) from the log-linearizing of the Euler equation (Eq.
3), substituting steady state hours from (Eq. A21) and assuming that:
t = log

Pt
Pt 1

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thus, we have:
1
Rt
= 

CA;t
CA;t+1
 
1 NA;t+1
1 NA;t
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) 1
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
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P
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P
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CA
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1
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P
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cA;t   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 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1 NAnA;t + 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+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)   logRt + logR =  (logCA;t   logCA)
+ (  logCA;t+1 + logCA;t)
+' (1  ) NA
1 NA (  logNA;t + logNA)
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
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(logRt   logR)
+'

1

  1

1
'
1  
1 GY

(  logNA;t + logNA)
+'

1

  1

1
'
1  
1 GY

(logNA;t+1   logNA)
  1

log

Pt+1
Pt

) cA;t+1 = cA;t + 1

rt
 

1

  1

1  
1 GY

nA;t
+

1

  1

1  
1 GY

nA;t+1
  1

t+1
) cA;t = cA;t+1   1

rt +
1

t+1
+

1

  1

1  
1 GY

nA;t
 

1

  1

1  
1 GY

nA;t+1
) cA;t = cA;t+1   1

(rt   t+1)
+

1

  1

1 GY + TY
1 GY

(nA;t   nA;t+1)
) cA;t = EtcA;t+1   1

(rt   Ett+1) +

1

  1

1 +
TY
1 GY

(nA;t   EtnA;t+1)
Relation (Eq. 28), is obtained log-linearizing expression (Eq. 5) and assuming
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that:
wt = log

Wt=Pt
W=P

thus:
CA;t
LA;t
=
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
)
CA;t
1 NA;t =
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
)
CA
1 NA +
1
1 NA cA;tCA +
CA
(1 NA)2
nA;tNA =
(1  )
'
W
P
+
(1  )
'

1
P
wtW   W
P 2
ptP

)
CA
1 NA +
CA
1 NA cA;t +
CA
(1 NA)2
nA;tNA =
(1  )
'
W
P
+
(1  )
'
W
P
[wt   pt])
1 + cA;t +
NA
1 NAnA;t = 1 + wt   pt )
logCA;t   logCA + NA
1 NA (logNA;t   logNA) = logWt   logW   logPt + logP )
NA
1 NA (logNA;t   logNA) = log

P
Pt
Wt
W

  (logCA;t   logCA))
N
1 N nA;t = wt   cA;t
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Relation (Eq. 29), is obtained log-linearizing expression (Eq. 8):
CN;t
LN;t
=
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
)
CN;t
1 NN;t =
(1  )
'
Wt
Pt
)
CN
1 NN +
1
1 NN cN;tCN +
CN
(1 NN )2
nN;tNN =
(1  )
'
W
P
+
(1  )
'

1
P
wtW   W
P 2
ptP

)
CN
1 NN +
CN
1 NN cN;t +
CN
(1 NN )2
nN;tNN =
(1  )
'
W
P
+
(1  )
'
W
P
[wt   pt])
1 + cN;t +
NN
1 NN nN;t = 1 + wt   pt )
logCN;t   logCN + NN
1 NN (logNN;t   logNN ) = logWt   logW   logPt + logP )
NN
1 NN (logNN;t   logNN ) = log

P
Pt
Wt
W

  (logCA;t   logCA))
N
1 N nN;t = wt   cN;t
The log-linearized budget constraint for non-asset holders (Eq. 30) is obtained log-
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linearizing expression (Eq. 7):
PtCN;t = (1  )WtNN;t   PtTt )
PtCN;t + CNptP + PcN;tCN = (1  )WNN + (1  )NNwtW + (1  )WnN;tNN
 PT   TptP   PttT )
CNptP + PcN;tCN = (1  )NNwtW + (1  )WnN;tNN   TptP   PttT )
CNptP + PcN;tCN = (1  )NNW (wt + nN;t)  PT (pt + tt))
P
P
CN
Y
pt +
P
P
CN
Y
cN;t = (1  ) NN
Y
W
P
(wt + nN;t)  T
Y
(pt + tt))
(1 GY ) pt + (1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) NN
Y
W
P
(wt + nN;t)  TY (pt + tt))
(1 GY ) pt + (1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) N
Y
C
L
'
(1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY (pt + tt))
(1 GY ) pt + (1 GY ) cN;t = ' N
1 N
C
Y
(wt + nN;t)  TY (pt + tt))
(1 GY ) pt + (1 GY ) cN;t = ' (1 GY ) 1
'
1  
1 GY (wt + nN;t)  TY (pt + tt))
(1 GY ) pt + (1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY pt   TY tt )
(1 GY + TY ) pt + (1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt )
(1  ) pt + (1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt )
(1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt   (1  ) pt
) (1 GY ) (logCN;t   logCN ) = (1  ) (logWt   logW )
+ (1  ) (logNN;t   logNN )  TY (log Tt   log T )  (1  ) (logPt   logP )
) (1 GY ) (logCN;t   logCN ) = (1  ) log

P
Pt
Wt
W

+(1  ) (logNN;t   logNN )  TY (log Tt   log T )
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) (1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt
From expressions (Eq. 29) and (Eq. 30) we obtain equation (Eq. 31):
8><>:
N
1 N nN;t = wt   cN;t
(1 GY ) cN;t = (1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt
)
8><>:
1
'
1 
1 GY nN;t = wt   cN;t
cN;t =
1
(1 GY ) [(1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt]
)
8><>: nN;t = '
1 GY
1  (wt   cN;t)
cN;t =
1
(1 GY ) [(1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt]
) nN;t = '1 GY
1  

wt   1
(1 GY ) ((1  ) (wt + nN;t)  TY tt)

) nN;t = '

1 GY
1   wt   wt   nN;t +
TY tt
1  

) 'nN;t + nN;t = '

1 GY
1   wt   wt +
TY tt
1  

) nN;t = '
1 + '

1 GY
1   wt   wt +
TY tt
1  

) nN;t = '
1 + '

wt  GY wt   wt + wt + TY tt
1  

) nN;t = '
1 + '

wt ( GY + ) + TY tt
1  

) nN;t = '
1 + '
 wtTY + TY tt
1  

) nN;t = '
1 + '
  TY
1 GY + TY

(wt   tt)
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Expression (Eq. 32) is obtained log-linearizing equation (Eq. 25) and assuming:
NA = NN = N
thus:
Nt = NN;t + (1  )NA;t )
N + ntN = NN + nN;tNN + (1  )NA + (1  )nA;tNA )
N + ntN = N + nN;tN + (1  )N + (1  )nA;tN )
1 + nt = + nN;t + 1  + (1  )nA;t )
nt = nN;t + (1  )nA;t
Expression (Eq. 33) is obtained log-linearizing equation (Eq. 24) and assuming:
CA = CN = C
thus:
Ct = CN;t + (1  )CA;t )
C + ctC = CN + cN;tCN + (1  )CA + (1  ) cA;tCA )
C + ctC = C + cN;tC + (1  )C + (1  ) cA;tC )
1 + ct = + cN;t + 1  + (1  ) cA;t )
ct = cN;t + (1  ) cA;t
The log-linearized aggregate production function (Eq. 34) is obtained from ex-
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pression (Eq. 11):
Yt (i) = Nt (i)  F )
Y + ytY = N + ntN   F =)
Y + ytY = Y + F + nt (Y + F )  F =)
ytY = nt (Y + F ) =)
yt = (1 + FY )nt
The new-Keynesian Phillips curve (Eq. 35) is obtained combining the equation
of the price setting problem (Eq. 12):
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s

P t (i) 
"
"  1Wt

= 0
together with the dynamics of the price:
Pt =
h
 (Pt 1)
1 
+ (1  ) (P t )1 
i 1
1 
From the dynamics of the price level:
Pt =
h
P 1 t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 
i 1
1 
we have that in steady state:
P =
h
P 1  + (1  ) (P )1 
i 1
1  )
P 1  = P 1  + (1  ) (P )1  )
P 1  (1  ) = (1  ) (P )1  )
P = P 
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Again from the dynamics of the price level without subscript i:
P 1 t = P
1 
t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 
dividing by P 1 "t we obtain:
P 1 t
P 1 t
= 
P 1 t 1
P 1 t
+ (1  ) (P

t )
1 
P 1 t
dening:
Vt =
P t
Pt
and : V = 1
we have:
1 = 

Pt 1
Pt
1 
+ (1  )V 1 "t
log-linearizing this expression:
(1  ")

P
P
 "
1
P
pt 1P   (1  ")

P
P
 "
P
P 2
ptP + (1  ") (1  )V  "pvtV = 0)
pt 1   pt + (1  ) vt = 0)
  (pt   pt 1) + (1  ) vt = 0)
(1  ) vt = t )
thus:
vt =

1  t (Eq. A22)
Moreover, from expression (Eq. 12), ignoring subscript i for simplicity:
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s

P t  
"
"  1Wt+s

= 0
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in steady state we have:
P   "
"  1W = 0)
P =
"
"  1W )
W
P
=
"  1
"
Again from (Eq. 12):
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s

P t  
"
"  1Wt+s

= 0)
Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA;t
CA;t+s
 
LA;t+s
LA;s
'(1 )
Pt
Pt+s

P t  
"
"  1Wt+s

= 0)
Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA;t
CA;t+s
 
LA;t+s
LA;s
'(1 ) 
Pt
Pt+s
P t  
Wt+s
Pt+s
Pt
"
"  1

= 0
multiplying both sides for 1Pt gives:
Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA;t
CA;t+s
 
LA;t+s
LA;s
'(1 )
1
P t

Pt
Pt+s
P t  
Wt+s
Pt+s
Pt
"
"  1

= 0)
Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA;t
CA;t+s
 
LA;t+s
LA;s
'(1 ) 
Pt
Pt+s
P t
P t
  1
Pt+s
Pt
P t
"
"  1Wt+s

= 0)
Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA;t
CA;t+s
 
LA;t+s
LA;s
'(1 ) 
Pt
Pt+s
 MCt+s 1
Vt
"
"  1

= 0(Eq. A23)
where we dene:
MCt+s =
Wt+s
Pt+s
(Eq. A24)
in steady state:
MCt+s =
W
P
=
"  1
"
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log-linearizing this expression:
Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA
CA
 1
1
CA

LA;
LA
'(1 ) 
P
P
  "
"  1MC
1
V

cA;tCA
 Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA
CA
 1
CA
C2A

LA;
LA
'(1 ) 
P
P
  "
"  1MC
1
V

cA;t+1CA
+Et
1X
s=0
ss' (1  )

CA
CA
 
LA
LA
'(1 ) 1
1
LA

P
P
  "
"  1MC
1
V

lA;t+1LA
 Et
1X
s=0
ss' (1  )

CA
CA
 
LA
LA
'(1 ) 1
LA
L2A

P
P
  "
"  1MC
1
V

lA;tLA
+Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA
CA
 
LA
LA
'(1 ) 
1
P

ptP
 Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA
CA
 
LA
LA
'(1 ) 
"
"  1
P
P 2
1
V

pt+sP
 Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA
CA
 
LA
LA
'(1 ) 
1
Vt
"
"  1

mct+sMC
+Et
1X
s=0
ss

CA
CA
 
LA
LA
'(1 ) 
"
"  1
W
P
1
V 2

vtV
= 0
for simplicity, we eliminate expectation operator:
1X
s=0
sspt  
1X
s=0
sspt+s  
1X
s=0
ssmct+s +
1X
s=0
ssvt = 0)
1X
s=0
ssvt =
1X
s=0
sspt+s  
1X
s=0
sspt +
1X
s=0
ssmct+s )
vt
1X
s=0
ss =  pt
1X
s=0
ss +
1X
s=0
ss (pt+s +mct+s)
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since:
0 < ss < 1)
1X
s=0
ss =
1
1  
Thus, we can rewrite:
vt
1
1   =  pt
1
1   + 
1X
s=0
ss (pt+s +mct+s))
vt
1
1   + pt
1
1   = 
1X
s=0
ss (pt+s +mct+s))
vt + pt = (1  )
1X
s=0
ss (pt+s +mct+s) (Eq. A25)
Last expression can be rewritten as:
vt + pt = (1  ) (pt + wt) +  (pt+1 + vt+1) (Eq. A26)
Now we demonstrate that expressions (Eq. A25) and (Eq. A26) are equivalent.
Indeed, taking equation (Eq. A26) at t  1:
vt 1 + pt 1 = (1  ) (pt 1 + wt 1)   (pt + vt))
  (vt 1 + pt 1) +  (pt + vt) =   (1  ) (pt 1 + wt 1))
(pt + vt)  1

(vt 1 + pt 1) =   (1  )

(pt 1 + wt 1)
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dening:
lt = pt + vt
ut 1 = pt 1 + wt 1
 =
1

 =   (1  )

we have:
lt   lt 1 = ut 1 )
lt 1 =  1lt    1ut 1
lagging one period:
lt = 
 1lt+1    1ut ) 
1   1L 1 lt =   1ut
where :  1 < 1
and : L is the lag operator
thus:
lt =   1 1 
1   1L 1ut )
lt =   1

1X
s=0
 sut+s
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substituting we obtain expression (Eq. A25):
pt + vt =  

  (1  )


()
1X
s=0
ss (pt+s +mct+s))
pt + vt = (1  )
1X
s=0
ss (pt+s +mct+s)
Thus, taking equation (Eq. A26):
vt + pt = (1  ) (pt + wt) +  (pt+1 + vt+1))
vt + pt = pt +mct   pt   mct +  (pt+1 + vt+1))
vt = mct (1  ) +  (pt+1   pt + vt+1))
vt = mct (1  ) +  (t+1 + vt+1) (Eq. A27)
putting expression (Eq. A22) into (Eq. A27) gives:

1  t = mct (1  ) + 

t+1 +

1  t+1

)

1  t = mct (1  ) + 

1 +

1  

t+1 )

1  t = mct (1  ) + 

1  t+1 )
t = Ett+1 +
(1  ) (1  )

mct (Eq. A28)
Moreover, from (Eq. A24):
MCt+s =
Wt+s
Pt+s
mct+sMC =
1
P
log (Wt+s  W )W   W
P 2
log (Pt+s   P )P )
mct+s = logWt+s   logW   logPt+s + logP )
mct+s = log

Wt+s=Pt+s
W=P

)
mct+s = wt (Eq. A29)
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thus, putting expression (Eq. A29) into (Eq. A28) we obtain the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve (Eq. 35):
t = Ett+1 +
(1  ) (1  )

wt
Linearization of the government budget constraint (Eq. 14) around a steady state
with zero debt and a balanced primary budget yields expression (Eq. 36):
1
Rt
Bt+1 = Bt + Pt [Gt   Yt   Tt]
dividing by Pt:
R 1t Bt+1
1
PtYt
= Bt
1
PtYt
+
Pt
Pt

Gt
Yt
   Yt
Yt
  Tt
Yt

)
R 1t
Bt+1
PtYt
=
Bt
PtYt
+
Gt
Yt
     Tt
Yt
Linearizing this expression:
 R 2 B
PY
(Rt  R) +R 1 1
PY
(Bt+1  B)
 R 1 B
P 2Y
(Pt   P ) R 1 B
PY 2
(Yt   Y )
=
1
PY
(Bt  B)  B
P 2Y
(Pt   P )  B
PY 2
(Yt   Y )
+
1
Y
gtG  G
Y 2
ytY   1
Y
ttT +
T
Y 2
ytY
Assuming steady state with zero debt:
R 1
Bt+1
PY
=
Bt
PY
+GY gt   TY tt + yt (TY  GY ) (Eq. A30)
Assuming a balanced primary budget:
Pt 1 = Pt = P
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Using expression (Eq. A17) and dening:
b^t =
Bt
Pt 1Yt 1
Finally, adding all these conditions, equation (Eq. A30) gives the government budget
constraint linearized (Eq. 36):
b^t+1 = b^t +GY gt   TT tt   yt
Expression (Eq. 37) is obtained log-linearizing expression (Eq. 16) and dividing
by Yt:
Gt = NMt +Mt )
Gt
Yt
=
NMt
Yt
+
Mt
Yt
)
1
Y
gtG  G
Y 2
ytY =
1
Y
nmtNM   NM
Y 2
ytY +
1
Y
mtM   M
Y 2
ytY )
gtGY  Gyt = nmtNMY  NMyt +mtMY  Myt )
gtGY = nmtNMY +mtMY + yt (G NM  M))
gtGY = nmtNMY +mtMY
The log-linearized structural primary decit (Eq. 38) is obtained by expression
(Eq. 20):
Ds;t = Gt   Tt   Y
Assuming that:
d^s;t =
Y
Y
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We have that:
Ds;t = Gt   Tt   Y )
Ds + ds;tDs = G+ gtG  T   ttT )
ds;tDs = gtG  ttT )
ds;t
1
Y
Ds = gt
1
Y
G  tt 1
Y
T )
d^s;t = GY gt   TY tt
Log-linearized good market clearing condition (Eq. 41) is obtained from expres-
sion (Eq. 23):
Yt = Ct +Gt )
Y + ytY = C + ctC +G+ gtG)
ytY = ctC + gtG)
yt = ctCY + gtGY )
yt = gtGY + ct (1 GY )
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4 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING COMPO-
NENTS: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS ON
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
A classic question in macroeconomics concerns the size of the government spending
multiplier. There is a large empirical literature that analyses the dimension of gov-
ernment spending multiplier. Authors such as Barro (1981) argue that the multiplier
is around 0:8 while authors such as Ramey (2008) estimate the multiplier to be closer
to 1:217. There is also a large literature that uses general-equilibrium models to study
the size of the government-spending multiplier. In standard new-Keynesian models
the government-spending multiplier can be somewhat above or below one depending
on the exact specication of agents preferences (see Gali, López-Salido and Vallés
2007, and Monacelli and Perotti 2008). In frictionless Real Business Cycle models
this multiplier is typically less than one (see e.g. Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichen-
baum 1992, Baxter and King 1993, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher 2004, Ramey
and Shapiro 1998, and Ramey 2008).
From this debate comes out a very basic question: which scal policy component
is associated with the highest multiplier? For this reason, the present paper investi-
gates how di¤erent categories of public expenditure a¤ect private consumption. The
relevance of the issue concerns private consumption as major weight among aggre-
gate demand components, as showed by Figure 1. This in turn is the reason why
consumptions response to economic stimulus plans is the key determinant of output
multipliers.
17For recent contributions to the VAR-based empirical literature on the size of the government spending multiplier
see Fisher and Peters (2009) and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2009).
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Figure 1: Private consumption as % of GDP
In the present paper, we perform a structural VAR analysis on the US economy.
As it is well known, there are two alternative approaches to the identication of scal
policy shocks in the VAR literature. On one side, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) have
perhaps the most careful and comprehensive approach to estimate scal shocks using
VARs. To identify shocks, they rst incorporate institutional information on taxes,
transfers, and spending to set parameters, and then estimate the VAR. They analyse
the contemporaneous relationship between taxes and GDP and they nd that gov-
ernment spending does not respond to GDP or taxes contemporaneously. Thus, their
identication of government spending shocks is identical to a Choleski decomposi-
tion in which government spending is ordered as the most exogenous compared to the
other variables. When they augment the system to include consumption, they nd
that consumption rises in response to a positive government spending shock. Galí et
al. (2007) use this basic identication method in their study which focuses only on
government spending shocks and not taxes. They estimate a VAR with additional
variables of interest, such as real wages, and order government spending as rst.
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On the other side, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) suggest that defence spending
is a major part of the variation in government spending around trend. For this
reason many analyses of government spending, including early contributions by Barro
(1981) and Hall (1986), focus on military spending when studying the macroeconomic
e¤ects of government spending. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a narrative approach
to identify shocks to government spending. Because of their concern that many
shocks identied from a VAR are simply anticipated changes in government spending,
they focus only on episodes where Business Week suddenly began to forecast large
rises in defence spending induced by major political events that were unrelated to
the state of the U.S. economy. In her paper, Ramey (2008) states that a concern
with the VAR identication scheme is that some of what it classies as shocks
to government spending may well be anticipated. Thus, it is essential to identify
when news becomes available about a major change in the present discounted value
of government spending. For this reason she shows that the war dates (the Korean
war military build-up, the Vietnam war build-up, the Reagan scal expansion, the
US reaction of 2001 terrorist attacks), as well as professional forecasts, predict the
VAR government spending shocks. She also shows how in each war episode, the VAR
shocks are positive several quarters after Business Week or the O¢ ce of Management
and Budget started forecasting increases in defence spending. Finally she shows that
delaying the timing of the Ramey-Shapiro dates produces the Keynesian results.
In this paper we take a strategy more in line with a new-Keynesian approach. We
justify it in several ways, imposing alternative types of structural restrictions: they
can be sign restrictions on the impulse response functions (Uhlig 2005, Mountford and
Uhlig 2005, Canova and Pappa 2007, Enders et al. 2008), external and institutional
information exploiting the quarterly nature of data and scal policy decision lags
(Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Perotti 2005, Muller 2008, Monacelli and Perotti 2008),
or restrictions on contemporaneous relations among variables and error terms in the
structural form (Marcellino 2006, Beetsma et al. 2006, Beetsma 2008, Benetrix
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and Lane 2009). Using quarterly data from 1960 to 2008 and in line with some
recent studies (Beetsma et al. 2006, Beetsma 2008, Giordano et al. 2007, Cavallo
2005 and 2007) we do not focus on public nance aggregates but rather on budget
decits single components. Our disaggregation is mainly on the expenditure side,
as we are primarily concerned with the aggregate consumption e¤ects of di¤erent
public expenditure categories. Here, we distinguish among military and non-military
expenditures.
Our results show that the only component resulting in a positive and signicant
response of private consumption and gross domestic product is non-military expendi-
ture. On the other hand, military spending seems to have a negative and signicant
e¤ect. Regarding the magnitude of those e¤ects, the impact on private consump-
tion of a civilian spending shock equal to 1% is in absolute terms higher than the
one (of the same magnitude) to the military component: after eight quarters, while
shocks to the former lead to a +1.91% impact on GDP, shocks to the latter cause
a -0.21% cumulative response. A consequence of our analysis is that using total
government expenditure (by aggregating the two components above) does not seem
to be a reasonable simplication: in fact, when these two components of govern-
ment expenditure enter the VAR in a unique aggregate measure, the result is a lower
impact on private consumption.
In the second part of our work we turn to the development of a simple dynamic
general equilibrium model that can potentially account for that evidence. Our frame-
work encompasses many ingredients of recent dynamic optimizing sticky price mod-
els, though we modify the latter by allowing for the presence of rule-of-thumb be-
haviour by some households18. Following Campbell and Mankiw (1989), we assume
that rule-of-thumb consumers do not borrow or save; instead, they are assumed to
consume their current income fully. In our model, rule-of-thumb consumers coexist
with conventional innite-horizon Ricardian consumers. As described subsequently,
18See, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), or Woodford (2003) for a
description of the standard new Keynesian model.
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our model predicts responses of aggregate consumption and other variables that are
in line with the existing evidence, given plausible calibrations of the fraction of rule-
of-thumb consumers, the degree of price stickiness, and the extent of decit nancing.
The present paper can be relevant because we provide empirical and theoretical
evidence that considering the indistinct aggregate of government expenditure can be
very misleading. The identication of non-military as the only government expen-
diture category which is e¤ective in stimulating private consumption leads to two
remarks: (i) the complementarity/substitutability issue cannot be discussed inde-
pendently from a su¢ cient disaggregation of government expenditure (ii) the rule-of
thumb-consumers approach can be justied on the existence of a precise portion of
public expenditure that stimulates a fraction of consumers, specically those who
are the benecial of non-military expenditure, and who consume out of it.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents our
empirical evidence, showing the data and discussing the identication procedure.
Section 4.3 contains the estimation results with particular regard to the reaction of
private consumption to di¤erent kinds of government expenditure shocks. Section 4.4
lays out the model and its di¤erent blocks. Section 4.5 contains the model calibration.
Section 4.6 examines the equilibrium response to the di¤erent government spending
shocks, focusing on the response of consumption and its consistency with the existing
evidence. Section 4.7 concludes and discusses policy implications.
4.2 SPECIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE MODEL
The strategy we adopt in this paper is based on two basic assumptions. The rst is
related to the nature of scal policy shocks. Indeed, unlike monetary policy measures,
changes to government spending and taxes are typically decided and publicized well
in advance of their implementation. As a consequence, the estimated innovations of
a VAR are such only with respect to the information set of the econometrician, but
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not of the private sector, and the interest rate response will pick up the e¤ects of
the anticipated components of scal policy (the Sims conjecture, 1988). However,
there are many reasons why scal decisions announced in advance might not be
taken at face value by the public. The yearly budget is often largely a political
document, which is discounted by the private sector as such; any decision to change
taxes or spending in the future can be modied before the planned implementation
time arrives; and ...changes in expenditure policy typically have involved not simply
changes in program rules, but rather changes in future spending targets, with the
ultimate details left to be worked out later and the feasibility of eventually meeting
the targets uncertain(Auerbach (2000), p. 16).
The second assumption concerns the variables used in order to estimate the model.
With respect to the narrative approach we introduce the distinction of military and
non-military expenditures and government budget decit. Indeed, we believe that
the e¤ects of public spending on the economy cannot be correctly analyzed without
accounting for both the interaction of military/non-military expenditures and the
nancing mechanism of the spending. First, complementarity/substitution e¤ects
between defence and non-defence expenditures are essential in order to identify the
nal e¤ect on consumption and GDP. Second, the way in which government decides
to nance public expenditure, by tax increases or issuing debt, plays an important
role on the agent decisions about consumption.
Thus, as benchmark specication of our model we adopt a structural VAR, whose
reduced form is dened by the following dynamic equation:
Yt = c+A (L)Yt 1 + Ut (Eq. 1)
where Yt indicates the vector of variables specied below, A (L) represents an auto
regressive lag polynomial, c is a constant term and Ut denotes the vector of reduced-
form innovations.
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We focus on United States and use data from 1960Q1 to 2008Q4. According to
Giordano et al. (2007) the availability of quarterly scal variables represents the
main constraint for the analysis of scal policy with VAR models. The end of the
sample corresponds the acceleration of the nancial crises began with the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which triggered unconventional policy moves
by the Federal Reserve Bank (Brunner-meier 2009, and Castelnuovo 2010).
In equation (Eq. 1) we assume a ve-variables vector Yt = [Ct; Nt; DINCt; BDt; GTOTt]
composed by private consumption (Ct), hours worked (Nt), disposable income (DINCt),
the government budget decit (BDt) and the total government spending (GTOTt).
The variables are all integrated of order 1. The source for almost all of the variables
that we used is the OECD Economic Outlook No. 88. The specication includes:
the log of real private nal consumption expenditure per capita C, a measure of
hours worked N was obtained by multiplying the hours worked per employee in the
total economy by total employment and expressing it in log per capita terms, dispos-
able income DINC corresponds to real personal disposable income (obtained from
the FRED-II database), the log of real total government spending per capita GTOT
(obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts), a
measure of budget decit BD that corresponds to gross government xed capital for-
mation (IG) minus net government saving (SAV G). The resulting variable, expressed
in nominal terms, was normalized by the lagged trend nominal GDP. All the other
real variables are deated by the GDP deator. The variables expressed in per capita
terms are divided by working-age population.
As identication strategy, we adopt a Cholesky factorization so to recover the
vector of structural shocks "t (and its variance 
) from the reduced-form error Ut in
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(Eq. 1), according to the following scheme:
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The Cholesky ordering as in (Eq. 2) corresponds to assume the following set of
conditions. Consumption is the most endogenous variable and it is therefore a¤ected
by all contemporaneous values of all the variables in the VAR; this is natural, as
the present study is primarily concerned with the analysis of macroeconomic e¤ects
on private consumption. Hours worked are allowed to depend on disposable income.
Indeed, agents choose their optimal quantity of labour supply depending on changes
in their net income. Total public spending is modeled as the most exogenous variable.
The interaction between government expenditure and taxation rate inuences budget
decit and disposable income. If the government spending increase is nanced by tax
raises budget decit is positive and private disposable income decreases. Contrary,
if the public expenditure rise is not followed by a corresponding increase in taxation
rate budget decit is negative and private disposable income increases.
Since we are primarily concerned with private consumption e¤ects of di¤erent
public spending categories we impose a disaggregation on the expenditure side, dis-
tinguishing among civilian and military expenditures. Thus, the vector of variables
Yt in equation (Eq. 1) can be expressed as Yt = [Ct; Nt; DINCt; BDt; NMt;Mt] where
NMt and Mt are the public civilian spending and government spending for military
sector, respectively. We collect data for both variables from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Economic Accounts. Military spending, M , corresponds to na-
tional defence data, whereas civilian spending, NM , is obtained by the di¤erence
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between government consumption expenditures and gross investment data and na-
tional defence data. Both the variables are deated by respective deators and are
expressed in log per capita terms. The Cholesky factorization we adopt in this case
is given by:
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In the Cholesky ordering of relation (Eq. 3) we assume that following conditions hold.
According to the previous reasoning private consumption, hours worked, disposable
income and budget decit are allowed to depend on scal variables that are modeled
as follows. Military expenditure is assumed to be more rigid than civilian spending
(following Ramey, 2008). First, it is well known that defence spending accounts
for almost all of the volatility of total government spending (including non-defence
share). Second, large rises in defence spending are induced by major political events
that are unrelated to the state of the U.S. economy.
In order to test total government, civilian and military expenditures multipliers
on output we include as additional variable the log of real GDP per capita (obtained
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts). We would
like to remark in advance that the two schemes presented above could be arguable
(as it is often the case of Cholesky ordering). However we believe that the data
frequency grants us a su¢ cient degree of exibility in the choice.
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4.3 ESTIMATION RESULTS
We use two di¤erent specications for the VAR reduced form equation (Eq. 1). In
the case of the aggregated government spending, we also include a linear time trend
because we observed that at least four of ve variables contain a deterministic trend.
Moreover, as suggested by the descriptive analysis, we include a shift-dummy for a
break point related to the monetary policy change in October 1978 just before the
beginning of the Volcker chairmanship. This choice conforms to the evidence on two
phenomena that are relevant, namely the nancial liberalization occurring in the
early 1980s and the general changes in business-cycle dynamics. Whereas, in the
case of disaggregation of public spending into military and civilian components we
add a trend that starts in the second quarter of 1973 (following Ramey, 1998) and a
shift-dummy for a break point related to the oil price shock of 1974 (Perron, 1989).
We estimate both specications using least squares. The number of lags is set to
two according to the Akaike Information Criterion and the absence of serial correla-
tion in the residuals, positively checked with a Lagrange Multiplier test. Moreover,
we failed to reject the hypothesis of normality of residuals with the Jarque-Bera sta-
tistics and we checked the stability condition of the VAR, nding that all eigenvalues
comfortably lie inside the unit circle. We also tested for the presence of cointegrating
relationships among the variables, nding mixed evidence according to the rank and
the maximum eigenvalue tests. Due to that, and given that our a priori did not
include a meaningful long-run relationship among the variables, we decided not to
impose any cointegrating restriction and, thus, estimate the VAR with the variables
in levels (Sims et al. 1990, Giordano et al. 2007).
Now we turn to discuss the results of the two specications. Figure 2 shows the
e¤ects of aggregate government spending on all the ve variables of the rst spec-
ication. In order to derive the 16th and 84th percentiles of the impulse response
distribution in the graphs, we perform Monte Carlo simulations and assume normal-
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ity in the parameter distribution. Based on that information, we construct t-tests
based on 1000 di¤erent responses generated by simulations, and check whether the
point estimates of the mean impulse responses are statistically di¤erent from zero.
The responses of all the six variables are expressed by multiplying the response from
the VAR (which is expressed in logs) by the sample average share of total public
spending in GDP (as in Monacelli and Perotti, 2006).
Figure 2 shows the e¤ects of aggregate spending shock when consumption is or-
dered as rst in the Cholesky factorization (left column) and when GDP is the most
endogenous variable (right column). Our results are in line with them shown by Galí
et al. (2007). In the rst row we note that total government spending raises signi-
cantly for both consumption and GDP cases, although it displays greater persistence
in the latter case. Second row shows the responses of consumption and GDP. Output
rises persistently to the shock, as predicted by the theory and, most interestingly,
consumption is also shown to rise on impact and to remain persistently above zero.
The responses are signicant in both cases, but only in GPD responses does the
increase stay signicant for an extended period. With respect to our labour variable,
the response of hours worked is reported on the third row. Here a signicant increase
can be observed only on the GDP case where hours rise persistently in response to
the scal shock, although with some delay relative to government spending itself19.
The fourth row depicts the response of disposable income. Although the point es-
timates for the rst few periods look rather similar, the response is signicantly
positive in GDP for about two years, but not so in consumption case. The last set
of panel pertain the government budget decit. Here the di¤erences across the two
cases are most remarkable: in the case of GDP the budget decit rises signicantly
on impact, and afterwards decreases becoming negative after two years, whereas in
the consumption case budget decit remains always positive.
19Fatás and Mihov (2001) also uncover a signicant rise in the real wage in response to a spending shock, using
compensation per hour in the non-farm business sector as a measure of the real wage.
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Figure 2: Response of all variables to a shock of GTOT
Note: Estimated impulse responses to aggregate government spending shock in the SVAR. The
horizontal axis represents quarters after the shock.
Condence intervals correspond to 1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on
1,000 Monte Carlo replications.
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In Figure 3 we show the impulse response functions to a civilian spending shock of
all the six variables in the second specication. The responses of all the six variables
are expressed by multiplying the response from the VAR (which is expressed in logs)
by the sample average share of civilian spending in GDP. As before we distinguish
on one hand the consumption e¤ects (left column) and on the other hand the output
e¤ects (right column) of a civilian spending shock. The rst row shows that civilian
spending increases signicantly for both consumption and GDP cases, even if in the
latter case the e¤ect is more persistent. From second row we note that shock in
civilian spending leads to an increase in private consumption, as it is assumed by the
credit constrained approach (Galí et al., 2007). Non-military shock has also a positive
e¤ect on output. Both responses are statistically signicant at conventional levels.
Moreover, both shocks are very persistent, even though the e¤ects are perceived after
two and four quarters in case of, respectively, consumption and output. The former
reaches the peak after 13 quarters, the latter after 7 quarters. The third row displays
the pattern of hours worked responses. Although in both cases there is an increase
to a shock in civilian spending, only for GPD case the response is signicant. In the
fourth row is shown the response of disposable income that increases in both cases,
but also in this case the response is signicant only in GDP case. More interestingly,
fth row depicts a signicant negative response of military spending due to a shock
in civilian spending. This substitution e¤ect is evidently signicant for both cases
of consumption and GDP. Finally, from the sixth row we note that, for both cases,
budget decit decreases and remains signicantly negative after a civilian spending
shock. From an economic point of view, this means that non-defence expenditure is
nanced by an increase in the taxation rate.
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Figure 3: Response of all variables to a shock of NM
Note: Estimated impulse responses to non-military spending shock in the SVAR. The horizontal
axis represents quarters after the shock.
Condence intervals correspond 1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on 1,000
Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 4: Response of all variables to a shock of M
Note: Estimated impulse responses to military spending shock in the SVAR. The horizontal axis
represents quarters after the shock.
Condence intervals correspond to 1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on
1,000 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 4 displays the impulse response functions of all six variables of the second
specication to an increase military spending. The responses of all the six variables
are expressed by multiplying the response from the VAR (which is expressed in logs)
by the sample average share of military spending in GDP. Also in Figure 4 we depict
on the left column consumption e¤ects and on right column GDP e¤ects of a military
spending shock. First row depicts a signicant increase of defence expenditure that
is more persistent in the consumption case. In the second row are shown the impulse
responses of consumption and output. We note that a shock in military spending
depresses private consumption, as predicted by neoclassical models. Also output has
a negative response to an increase in defence expenditure. Although both responses
have similar patterns they are not signicant. The response of the hours worked is
reported on the third row. Also in this case there is a negative but not signicant
e¤ect. Fourth row depicts the impulse responses of disposable income that decrease
in both case but are not signicant. In the fth row is reported the signicant
negative e¤ect of civilian spending when there is an increase in military expenditure.
This substitution e¤ect across the two sectors is evident both in consumption and
GDP e¤ects. Finally, sixth row pertains to the response of budget decit. We note
a signicant positive response of decit to a military spending shock. This result
conrms the assumption that defence sector is nanced by government debt.
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Table 1: Estimated e¤ects of total government, non-military and military shocks
Note: Estimated Fiscal Multipliers were obtained from the two di¤erent Cholesky factorizations.
Output corresponds to the results of 5-variable SVAR described in the text.
Consumption SVAR estimates are based on 6-variable SVAR including civilian and military
spending.
Our point estimates in Figure 2-4 imply that total government, civilian and mili-
tary spending multipliers on output, dYt+k=dGt, dYt+k=dNMt, dYt+k=dMt, are equal to
+0.09, +0.44 and -0.05, respectively, on fourth quarter (k = 4). After eight quarters
(k = 8) they are +0.57, +1.91 and -0.21, respectively. Finally, after twelve quarters
(k = 12) these multipliers correspond to +1.47, 3.62 and -0.31, respectively. Such es-
timated multipliers are of a magnitude similar to the ones reported by Blanchard and
Perotti (2002). They are also roughly consistent with the range of estimated short-
run expenditure multipliers generated by a variety of macroeconometric models20.
Most important for our purposes is the observation that multipliers on consumption
are positive for total and civilian expenditures whereas is negative for military ex-
penditure, in the ranges (+0.01,+0.12), (+0.36,+1.99) and (-0.05,-0.35), respectively
(see Table 1).
4.4 A BASELINE MODEL
We follow the seminal model of Galì et al. (2007). In particular, it is a new-Keynesian
model that encompasses two types of households. Each household maximises a util-
20Among the others, see Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002).
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ity function with two arguments: consumption goods and labour, over an innite
life horizon. Moreover, we assume a perfectly competitive rm producing a nal
good, and a continuum of intermediate rms that produce di¤erentiated goods and
set prices, according to sticky prices à la Calvo (1983). In this economy, government
is in charge of the scal policy that includes the several components of government
spending. Finally, a Central Bank drives monetary policy xing the nominal in-
terest rate by a Taylor rule (1993). In the next sections we describe the several
maximization problems that we derive in detail in Appendix A.
4.4.1 HOUSEHOLDS
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], that
live for an innite life horizon. These households are divided into Ricardian and non-
Ricardian ones. Ricardian households represent a share 1    and are able to trade
securities and accumulate physical capital that rent out to rms. Non-Ricardian
households consist of a share  and do not have access to capital markets, thus they
just consume their current labour income. In order to justify this kind of distinction
we refer to the paper of Campbell and Mankiw (1989) in which they provide evidence
of the existence of Ricardian households in the U.S. economy.
RICARDIAN HOUSEHOLDS. This kind of households have a life-time utility func-
tion, U (), given by:
U (Cot ; N
o
t ) = E0
1X
t=o
t
"
logCot  
(Not )
1+'
1 + '
#
(Eq. 4)
Here E0 is the conditional expectation operator, and Cot and Not denote time-t con-
sumption and hours worked, respectively. The discount factor is  2 (0; 1), and the
elasticity of wages with respect to hours worked is '  0.
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Ricardian households face the following budget constraint:
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and capital accumulation equation:
Kot+1 = (1  )Kot + 

Iot
Kot

Kot (Eq. 6)
We denote with T ot the lump sum taxes (or transfers, if negative) paid by these con-
sumers to government, while Dot are dividends from ownership of rms. The variable
Bot+1 denotes the quantity of one-period bonds purchased by these households at time
t. Also, Pt denotes the price level and Wt denotes the real wage rate. Rt denotes the
one-period nominal rate of interest that pays o¤ in period t. Kot represents the capi-
tal holding and Rkt its real rental cost. Finally Iot indicates investment expenditures
in real terms. Capital adjustment costs are introduced through the term 

Iot
Kot

Kot ,
which determines the change in the capital stock induced by investment spending.
We assume:

0

Iot
Kot

> 0

00

Iot
Kot

 0
with:

0
() = 1
 () = 
The subsequent maximization problem gives the following rst order conditions:
1 = RtEt

t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

(Eq. 7)
117
where the stochastic discount factor for real k-period ahead payo¤s characterizing
Ricardian households, who own the rms, is given by:
t;t+k = 
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
(Eq. 8)
and:
Qt = Et
0B@t;t+1
8><>:Rkt+1 +Qt+1
264 (1  )
 0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

375
9>=>;
1CA (Eq. 9)
where the real shadow value of capital, the so-called Tobins Q, is given by:
Qt =
1

0

Iot
Kot
 (Eq. 10)
We note that, under our assumption on , the elasticity of the investment-capital
ratio with respect to Q is given by:
  1

00
() 
 
We dont insert in this list of optimality conditions the labour decision equation
because we assume that wage is determined in a non-competitive labour market
structure (we analyze in details this aspect below).
NON-RICARDIAN HOUSEHOLDS. Typical households of this type have a life-
time utility function, U (), given by:
U (Crt ; N
r
t ) = logC
r
t  
(Nrt )
1+'
1 + '
(Eq. 11)
and face the following budget constraint:
PtC
r
t =WtPtN
r
t   PtT rt (Eq. 12)
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Expression (Eq. 12), implies that non-Ricardian households consume their disposable
income:
Crt =WtN
r
t   T rt (Eq. 13)
We note that taxes paid by non-Ricardian (T rt ) and Ricardian (T ot ) households can
di¤er. As before, we omit the labour decision equation in the FOCs for this kind
of households since we assume non-competitive labour market structure21 (see the
following discussion).
THE WAGE SCHEDULE. Labour market structure is such that there is an economy-
wide union setting wages in a centralized manner. Hence, hours worked are not cho-
sen optimally by households but are determined by rms given the wage set by the
union (see Appendix C for details). We assume that wages are determined according
to the following generalized schedule:
Wt = H (Ct; Nt) (Eq. 14)
where H is an increasing function on both its arguments Ct and Nt, which guarantees
the convex marginal disutility of labour and wealth e¤ects. Once that wage is set
by the union, rms decide the quantity of labour to hire allocating labour demand
uniformly across households Nrt = Not (see Appendix C). We also assume that wage
mark-up is such that the following inequalities hold all times:
H (Ct; Nt) > C
j
tN
'
t ; for : j = o; r
Last relation implies that Ricardian and non-Ricardian households will to meet rms
labour demand at the prevailing wage. Since the latter is assumed to remain above
21Assuming a non-competitive labour market structure we allow for the hours worked and consumption of non-
Ricardian households to comove positively with real wages. Under a perfectly competitive labour market this
condition no longer applies.
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the marginal rate of substitution all times, households choose optimally to supply as
much labour as it is demanded by the rms22.
4.4.2 FIRMS
The nal good, Yt, is produced by competitive rms using the technology:
Yt =
0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A
"p
"p 1
where the constant elasticity of substitution is "p > 1, and Xt (j), j 2 [0; 1], denotes the
intermediate good j.
Prot maximization implies the following rst order condition for Xt (j):
Xt (j) =

Pt (j)
Pt
 "p
Yt
where Pt (j) denotes the price of intermediate good j and Pt is the price of the homo-
geneous nal good. Perfect competition in the nal goods market implies that the
latter can be written as:
Pt =
24 1Z
0
Pt (j)
1 "p dj
35
1
1 "p
The intermediate good, Xt (j), is produced by a monopolistically competitive rms
using the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt (j) = Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1  (Eq. 15)
where Nt (j) and Kt (j) denote, respectively, employment and capital used by the jth
22 It is useful to remark that consistency with balanced-growth requires that H can be written as Cth (Nt).
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intermediate rm, while  is the capital elasticity. Cost minimization implies:
Kt (j)
Nt (j)
=

1  
Wt
Rkt
The rmsmarginal costs are given by:
MCt = 	(Wt)
1   
Rkt

where : 	 =   (1  ) (1 )
The intermediate rm is subject to Calvo style price-setting frictions and can
optimize its price with probability 1   , while with probability  it keeps its price
unchanged. Thus, the maximization problem can be expressed as:
max
fPt g
Et
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt;t+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
 MCt+k

(we note that t;t+k is the stochastic discount factor already dened in the household
maximization program) given the following demand constraints:
Yt+k (j) = Xt+k (j) =

P t
Pt+k
 "p
Yt+k
where P t denotes the optimal price chosen by the intermediate rm resetting prices
at time t.
The rst order condition of this problem is given by:
Et
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k

= 0 (Eq. 16)
where the mark-up is given by:
p 
"p
"p   1
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Finally, the law of motion of aggregate price is given by:
Pt =
h
P
1 "p
t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "p
i 1
1 "p (Eq. 17)
4.4.3 MONETARY POLICY
We assume that monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate, rt  Rt   1, fol-
lowing the rule:
rt = r + t (Eq. 18)
where r is the steady state level of interest rate and t denotes the time-t rate of
ination. According to equation (Eq. 18), the central bank follows a particular case
of the standard Taylor rule. Indeed, we assume that the coe¢ cients related to the
long run responses of the monetary authority to deviation of ination target and
output from its steady state value are equal to zero. Finally, from expression (Eq.
18), we note that the so-called Taylor principle is satised if the coe¢ cient related
to the long run response of interest rate to ination, , is bigger than one.
4.4.4 FISCAL POLICY
Since the aim of the present paper is to analyse the e¤ects of di¤erent components
of government spending on the economy we distinguish two di¤erent scal policies.
First, we focus on aggregate government expenditure and successively we split total
spending into civilian and military ones.
AGGREGATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING. The government purchases nal goods,
issues bonds and raises lump-sum taxes to nance spending. Thus, its budget con-
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straint is given by:
PtTt +R
 1
t Bt+1 = Bt + PtGt (Eq. 19)
where : Tt  T rt + (1  )T ot
The nancing of government expenditure is determined by the steady state deviations
of decit and total spending. Thus, the scal policy rule takes the following form
(see Galí et al., 2007):
tt = bbt + ggt (Eq. 20)
where : gt  Gt  G
Y
and : tt  Tt   T
Y
and : bt  (Bt=Pt 1)  (B=P )
Y
where b and g are the parameters capturing the response of taxes to budget decit
and total government spending respectively. Total government expenditure (in devi-
ations from steady state, and normalized by steady state output) evolves exogenously
according to a second order autoregressive process. We assume an AR(2) process
in line with our VAR based estimates of the dynamic responses of total government
spending:
gt = 
g
1gt 1 + 
g
2gt 2 + 
g
t (Eq. 21)
where : 0 < g1 < 1
0 < g2 < 1
gt  N
 
0; 2

where g1 and 
g
2 are the persistence parameters, whereas 
g
t is an i.i.d. shock.
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NON-MILITARY AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES. Focusing on the disaggre-
gation of total public spending we can express the government budget constraint
as:
PtTt +R
 1
t Bt+1 = Bt + PtGt (Eq. 22)
where : Tt  T rt + (1  )T ot
and : Gt = NMt +Mt
Expression (Eq. 22) encompasses the sum of civilian and military components ac-
cording to the additive principle. Government expenditure is nanced by the follow-
ing scal policy:
tt = bbt + nmnmt + mmt (Eq. 23)
where : nmt  NMt  NM
Y
and : mt  Mt  M
Y
where nm and m are the parameters indicating the response of taxes to non-military
and military spending, respectively. Moreover, nmt and mt are the resources devolved
to non-military and military sectors expressed as deviations from their respective
steady states, and normalized by steady state output. We assume that they are
exogenous autoregressive processes of order two driving the economy:
nmt = 
nm
1 nmt 1 + 
nm
2 nmt 2 + 
nm
t (Eq. 24)
where : 0 < nm1 < 1
0 < nm2 < 1
nmt  N
 
0; 2

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and:
mt = 
m
1 mt 1 + 
m
2 mt 2 + 
m
t (Eq. 25)
where : 0 < m1 < 1
0 < m2 < 1
mt  N
 
0; 2

where nm1 , m1 and nm2 , m2 are the persistence parameters, whereas nmt , mt are i.i.d.
shock of civilian and military expenditures. We would like to remark that, again,
we assume AR(2) processes in line with our VAR based estimates of the dynamic
responses of civilian and military expenditures.
4.4.5 AGGREGATION AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
The sum of the Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumption shares gives aggregate
consumption:
Ct  Crt + (1  )Cot (Eq. 26)
Similarly, adding labor supplied by Ricardian and non-Ricardian households gives
total hours:
Nt  Nrt + (1  )Not (Eq. 27)
By our assumption, all capital stock is held by Ricardian households:
Kt  (1  )Kot
and aggregate investment is given by:
It  (1  ) Iot
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A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium is a set of values for prices and quantities
such that the representative households and rms optimality conditions and the
market clearing conditions are satised. In this case, the clearing of factor markets
implies:
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt (j) dj
Kt =
Z 1
0
Kt (j) dj
Yt (j) = Xt (j) for all j
Final good market is in equilibrium if production equals demand by total household
consumption, aggregate private investment and total government spending:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (Eq. 28)
In the case of disaggregated government components, condition (Eq. 28) can be
expressed as:
Yt = Ct + It +NMt +Mt (Eq. 29)
4.4.6 LINEARIZED EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
In this section we show the system in the log-linear form where the variables with
small letters are log-deviations from the steady state and the variables without time
subscripts are at steady state (all the derivations are shown in Appendix B).
HOUSEHOLDS. The Q equation states that the current value of capital stock de-
pends positively on its expected future value and expected rental rate but negatively
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on the ex-ante interest rate:
qt = Et fqt+1g+ [1   (1  )]Et

rkt+1
	  (rt   Et ft+1g) (Eq. 30)
The relationship between Tobins Q equation and investment is given by:
it   kt = qt (Eq. 31)
The capital accumulation equation is standard:
kt+1 = it + (1  ) kt (Eq. 32)
The Euler equation for Ricardian households controls the dynamics of consumption
and real balances, where current consumption and real balances depend on their
expected values and the ex-ante interest rate:
cot = Et

cot+1
	  (rt   Et ft+1g) (Eq. 33)
The non-Ricardian consumption equation is given by:
crt =

WNr
Cr

(wt + n
r
t ) 

Y
Cr

trt (Eq. 34)
where : trt =
T rt   T r
Y
We assume that in steady state consumption across di¤erent household types is equal:
Cr = Co = C and this implies that Nr = No = N , as well. The assumption of equal
consumption levels in steady state is guaranteed by an appropriate choice of T r and
T o (see Appendix C).
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Thus, the aggregate consumption and labour expressions are given by:
ct = c
r
t + (1  ) cot (Eq. 35)
nt = n
r
t + (1  )not (Eq. 36)
In the case of non-competitive labour market structure, a log-linearized expression
for the generalized wage schedule Wt = H (Ct; Nt) is given by (see Appendix C):
wt = ct + 'nt (Eq. 37)
The intertemporal equilibrium condition for aggregate consumption is given by:
ct = Et fct+1g    (rt   Et ft+1g) nEt fnt+1g+tEt

trt+1
	
(Eq. 38)
We can derive expression (Eq. 38) in the non-competitive case, assuming that nrt =
not = nt and combining expressions (Eq. 37), (Eq. 33), (Eq. 34), (Eq. 35), (Eq. 36).
The coe¢ cients correspond to (for details see Appendix B):
 = c
p (1  )
n =  (1  ) (1 + ')
t = 
p
where :  = (c
p    (1  )) 1
and : c 
C
Y
We note that steady state consumption-output ratio, c, does not depend on  (as
shown in Appendix B).
FIRMS. The ination equation is a standard new-Keynesian Phillips curve stating
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that current ination depends on the expected future ination and on the deviation
of the average mark-up from its steady state level:
t =  ft+1g   p^pt (Eq. 39)
where : p = (1  ) (1  ) 1

knowing that:
^pt = (yt   nt)  wt (Eq. 40)
or, equivalently:
^pt = (yt   kt)  rkt (Eq. 41)
Final output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas function where we assume that
the total factor productivity is equal to one:
yt = (1  )nt + kt (Eq. 42)
FISCAL POLICY
AGGREGATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING. The linearized government bud-
get constraint around a steady state with zero debt and a balanced primary budget
is given by:
bt+1 =
1

(bt + gt   tt) (Eq. 43)
NON-MILITARY AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES. In the case of disaggre-
gation of public expenditure components the linearized budget constraint (Eq. 22)
is given by:
bt+1 =
1

(bt + nmt +mt   tt) (Eq. 44)
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MARKET CLEARING. The log-linearized market equilibrium condition for to-
tal government spending can be expressed as follows:
yt = cct + iit + gt (Eq. 45)
where : c =
C
Y
i =
I
Y
where i denotes the steady state investment-output ratio. Considering civilian and
military expenditures, log-linearization of expression (Eq. 29) is given by:
yt = cct + iit + nmt +mt (Eq. 46)
We solve numerically the system of equations (Eq. 30)-(Eq. 46) including also the
log-linerized Taylor rule (Eq. 18), the di¤erent scal policy rules and shocks.
4.5 MODEL CALIBRATION
We assume a quarterly calibration where the discount factor, , is set equal to 0.99,
which implies an annual steady state real interest rate of 4%. The depreciation rate,
, is set equal to 0.025 per quarter, which implies an annual depreciation on capital
equal to 10 percent. We set  equal to 0.30, which roughly implies a steady state share
of labour income in total output of 70%. In addition, we x the parameter capturing
the mark-up, P equal to 0.2. The fraction of non-Ricardian households, , is set
equal to 1/2, a value that is assumed by Galí et al. (2007) and is within the range of
estimated values in the literature (see Mankiw, 2000). The probability of rms that
keep their prices unchanged, , is xed to 0.75 (see Bilbiie et al., 2009). Whereas,
the value for the elasticity of wages with respect to hours worked, ', is set equal
to 0.2. This value is line with Rotemberg and Woodfords (1997, 1999) calibrations.
According to follow King andWatson (1996), the elasticity of investment with respect
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to q, , is xed to 1. We follow Galí et al. (2007) in the setting of the parameter
capturing the response of the monetary authority to ination, , equal to 1.5. This
value satises the so-called Taylor principle.
Focusing on the parameters describing the di¤erent scal policy rules we dis-
tinguish between the cases of total government spending and the disaggregation of
civilian and military components. In the rst case (equation Eq. 20), we set the
parameters capturing the response of taxes to budget decit and total government
spending, b = 0:13 and g = 0:10, respectively. Both values are within the range of
estimated values in Galí et al. (2007).
In order to calibrate the parameters of relation (Eq. 23) we follow the patterns
of the IRFs based on the VAR estimates. Moreover, from Galí et al. (2007), we
know that a positive comovement of consumption and output in response to gov-
ernment spending shocks requires a su¢ ciently high response of taxes to debt, and
a su¢ ciently low response of taxes to current government spending. Thus, in the
case of non-military spending shock, we increase b to 0.25 and x the parameter
capturing the response of taxes to civilian and military expenditures, nm, m, re-
spectively equal to 0.01 and 0.89. Whereas, in the case of military spending shock
we set b = 0:01 and nm = 0:5, m = 0:9.
The persistence parameters of the AR(2) shocks are calibrated using the VAR
based estimates of the dynamic responses of government spending. In particular, we
set g1, nm1 and m1 equal to 0.8 and 
g
2, nm2 and m2 equal to 0.1. These values reect the
highly persistent responses of total government, civilian and military expenditures
to their own shock.
Finally, we set g = 0:2, nm = 0:13 and nm = 0:07 which roughly correspond respec-
tively to the average share of total government, civilian and military expenditures in
GDP for the period 1960-2008.
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4.6 THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS
Figure 5 displays the dynamic responses of some key variables in our model to a
positive total government spending shock.
Figure 5: The dynamic e¤ects of a total government spending shock
Note: Aggregate government spending shock equal to 1%.
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The graphs in the rst row of Figure 5 display the pattern of spending and budget
decit in response to the shock considered. We notice that the pattern of both vari-
ables is close to the one nd by Galí et al. (2007). Both the responses of output and
consumption (graphs in the second row) are positive in a way consistent with much
of the recent evidence. In particular, the interaction between non-Ricardian house-
holds (whose consumption equals their labour income) and sticky prices (modelled
as in the recent new-Keynesian literature) makes it possible to generate an increase
in consumption in response to a persistent expansion in total government spending.
Furthermore, in our model, and in contrast with the neoclassical model, the increase
in aggregate hours coexists with an increase in real wages (graphs in third row).
The introduction of non-Ricardian households o¤sets the negative wealth e¤ects
generated by the higher levels of taxes needed to nance the scal expansion, while
making consumption more sensitive to current labour income (net of current taxes).
Sticky prices make it possible for real wages to increase, even if the marginal prod-
uct of labour goes down, since the price mark-up may decline su¢ ciently to more
than o¤set the latter e¤ect. The increase in the real wage, together with that of
employment, raises current labour income and hence stimulates the consumption of
non-Ricardian households. In this way we are able to obtain a crowding-in e¤ect of
aggregate consumption in response to total government spending shock.
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Figure 6: The dynamic e¤ects of a non-military spending shock
Note: Non-military military spending shock equal to 1%.
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Figure 7: The dynamic e¤ects of a military spending shock
Note: Military spending shock equal to 1%.
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Now we turn to discuss the simulation results of total public spending disaggre-
gation into civilian and military components. Figure 6 shows the impulse response
functions of the variables to a positive civilian spending shock. The graphs in the
rst row display respectively the pattern of civilian spending and budget decit in
response to the shock considered. First, we note that in order to nance civilian
spending, budget decit remains negative for all the period considered, consistently
with its estimated impulse response (see Figure 3). As regards the responses of out-
put and consumption, graphs of second row in Figure 6 show that all are positive
but higher with respect to the case of total government spending case and in line
with our empirical evidence.
The graphs in the last row display the responses of hours worked and military
spending to a shock in civilian sector. The former shows a positive pattern for all
the period considered. The latter clearly indicates that non-military and military
expenditures are clearly substitute. This means that the increase of non-defence
resources play a negative role in defence purchases decreasing it. This substitution
e¤ect of non-military/military expenditure is particularly relevant and underlines the
importance of disaggregating public spending components. Indeed, splitting public
spending components, and assuming a unique shock on civilian side, the e¤ect on
output, consumption and hours worked is amplied.
Finally, we analyze the military spending shock displaying the relative IRFs con-
cerning the several variables (Figure 7). The graphs in the rst row display the
pattern of military expenditure and budget decit in response to the shock consid-
ered. As we can see, contrary to civilian spending case, budget decit response is
positive when there is an increase in military spending. This is in line with the
relative estimated impulse response (see Figure 4).
Interestingly, consequently to a military shock the responses of output and con-
sumption are negative. In particular, private consumption (right graph in the second
row) decreases because hours worked (left graph in the third row) and wages comove
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negatively. This e¤ect, in turn, implies a negative response of output (left graph on
the second row). Also, these results are conrmed by our estimated impulse response
functions (see Figure 4).
The substitution e¤ect between military and civilian expenditures, clearly, appears
in Figure 7 (right graph of the last row). An increase to the resources devolved to
military sectors diminishes the ones devolved for the non-defence component.
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper carried out an analysis on US economy from 1960 to 2008 with the ob-
jective of verifying and quantifying the e¤ects of di¤erent broad categories of govern-
ment expenditure on private consumption, so to contribute to the empirical literature
which has reported mixed evidence so far. Our ndings obtained using structural
VAR method and reproduced by a DSGE model simulation can be summarized as
follows. GDP and private consumption seems to respond: i) positively to total
government purchases of goods and services; ii) positively to civilian spending; iii)
negatively to military expenditure. While i) and ii) strengthens the new-Keynesian
theoretical approach, known as the credit-constrainedagents, iii) seems to conrm
the standard neoclassical wealth e¤ect. Moreover, the way of nancing of di¤erent
public spending components is extremely relevant. In particular, military spending is
nanced by an increase in government budget decit, contrary to the civilian spend-
ing case. We also found a clear substitution e¤ect between the resources devolved
for the defence and non-defence sectors.
Quantitative estimates of the responsesmagnitude in our benchmark specica-
tion lead to an important policy implication: shocks to civilian spending have a
cumulative impact on GDP after three years - via private consumption - that is
ten times higher than military spending, with opposite signs. This suggests that
any expansionary e¤ect of non-defense expenditure might be potentially o¤set by a
137
parallel increase in pure military expenditure, with a negative e¤ect on aggregate
demand even though a overall increase in aggregate government expenditure has
occurred. This result shows that trying to measure the scal multiplier on private
consumption by considering the whole government expenditure aggregate - and not
its decomposition according to features and goals - can indeed be misleading.
While we believe that this analysis can represent a useful contribution to a more ef-
fective management of scal policy tools on the expenditure side, the general validity
of the ndings is certainly limited by the closed-economy one-country investigation.
We believe that an analysis on United Kingdom economy would permit the use of
easily-available annual data, allowing an interesting comparison and more complete
answer to our original question. This should probably be the most rationale next
step.
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4.8 APPENDIX A: MAXIMIZATION PROBLEMS OF THE MODEL
4.8.1 RICARDIAN HOUSEHOLDS.
A typical household of this type maximizes:
maxEt
1X
t=o
tU (Cot ; N
o
t ) (Eq. A1)
with : 0 <  < 1
where : U (Cot ; N
o
t ) = logC
o
t  
(Not )
1+'
1 + '
(Eq. A2)
with : '  0
subject to the sequence budget constraints:
Pt (C
o
t + I
o
t ) +R
 1
t B
o
t+1 =WtPtN
o
t +R
k
t PtK
o
t +B
o
t +D
o
t   PtT ot (Eq. A3)
and the capital accumulation equation:
Kot+1 = (1  )Kot + 

Iot
Kot

Kot (Eq. A4)
where : 
0

Iot
Kot

> 0
and : 
00

Iot
Kot

 0
and : 
0
() = 1
nally :  () = 
The lagrangian of this problem is:
L = Et
1X
t=o
t
8>>>><>>>>:

logCot   (N
o
t )
1+'
1+'

+ t
264 Pt (Cot + Iot ) +R 1t Bot+1
 WtPtNot  Rkt PtKot  Bot  Dot + PtT ot
375
+ t
h
(1  )Kot + 

Iot
Kot

Kot  Kot+1
i
9>>>>=>>>>;
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The rst order conditions for Cot and Lot are:
@L
@Cot
= 0)
t
1
Cot
+ ttPt = 0)
t =   1
Cot
1
Pt
(Eq. A5)
@L
@Not
= 0)
 t (Not )
'   ttWtPt = 0)
(Not )
'
=  tWtPt (Eq. A6)
We show in Appendix C the details of the non competitive labour market structure,
i.e. under the case of a non-competitive labour market condition.
The FOC for Bot+1 is:
@L
@Bot+1
= 0)
 t t   t+1t+1Rt+1+ = 0)
t
1
Rt
= t+1 (Eq. A8)
putting (Eq. A5) into (Eq. A8) we obtain the Euler equation:
  1
Cot
1
Pt
1
Rt
=    1
Cot+1
1
Pt+1
)
1
Rt
= 
Cot
Cot+1
Pt
Pt+1
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thus:
1 = RtEt

t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

(Eq. A9)
where the stochastic discount factor is:
t;t+k = 
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
(Eq. A10)
The FOC for Kot+1 is:
@L
@Kot+1
= 0)
 t t   t+1t+1Rkt+1Pt+1 + t+1 t+1
266664
(1  )
 0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
(Kot+1)
2Kot+1
+

Iot+1
Kot+1

377775 = 0 (Eq. A11)
The FOC for Iot+1 is:
@L
@Iot+1
= 0)
ttPt + 
t t


0

Iot
Kot

1
Kot
Kot

= 0)
tPt +  t


0

Iot
Kot

= 0)
 t =   1

0

Iot
Kot
 (tPt) (Eq. A12)
putting (Eq. A12) into (Eq. A11) we obtain the Tobins Q equation:
  t   t+1Rkt+1Pt+1 +  t+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

= 0)
1

0

Iot
Kot
 (tPt) t+1Rkt+1Pt+1  1

0

Iot+1
Kot+1
 (t+1Pt+1) (1  )  0  Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

= 0)
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Qt (tPt)  t+1Rkt+1Pt+1   Qt+1 (t+1Pt+1)

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

= 0)
Qt (tPt) = t+1R
k
t+1Pt+1 + Qt+1 (t+1Pt+1)

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

)
Qt (tPt) = (t+1Pt+1)

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

)
Qt (tPt) = (t+1Pt+1)

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

)
Qt

  1
Cot
1
Pt
Pt

= 

  1
Cot+1
1
Pt+1
Pt+1

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

)
Qt = 
Cot
Cot+1

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

)
Qt = Et
0BBBB@t;t+1
8>>>><>>>>:R
k
t+1 +Qt+1
266664
(1  )
 0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+

Iot+1
Kot+1

377775
9>>>>=>>>>;
1CCCCA (Eq. A13)
where:
Qt=
1

0

Iot
Kot
 (Eq. A14)
4.8.2 NON-RICARDIAN HOUSEHOLDS.
A typical household of this type seeks to maximize:
maxU (Crt ; N
r
t ) (Eq. A15)
where : U (Crt ; N
r
t ) = logC
r
t  
(Nrt )
1+'
1 + '
(Eq. A16)
subject to the budget constraint:
PtC
r
t =WtPtN
r
t   PtT rt (Eq. A17)
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The lagrangian associated to this problem is:
L =
"
logCrt  
(Nrt )
1+'
1 + '
#
+ t [PtC
r
t  WtPtNrt + PtT rt ] (Eq. A18)
the rst order conditions for Crt and Nrt are:
@L
Crt
= 0)
1
Crt
+ tPt = 0)
t =   1
Crt
1
Pt
(Eq. A19)
@L
Nrt
= 0)
  (Nrt )
'   tWtPt = 0)
tWtPt =   (Nrt )
'
(Eq. A20)
Alternatively, when the wage is set by a union, hours are determined by rmslabour
demand. Again we refer the reader to the subsequent discussion.
4.8.3 FINAL GOOD FIRMS.
Taking the following constant returns technology:
Yt =
0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A
"p
"p 1
(Eq. A21)
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Prot maximization, taking as given the nal goods price Pt and the prices for the
intermediate goods Pt (j), all j 2 [0; 1], yields the set of demand schedules:
max
Xt(j)
PtYt  
1Z
0
Pt (j)Xt (j) dj (Eq. A22)
Putting equation (Eq. A21) into (Eq. A22):
max
Xt(j)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A
"p
"p 1
 
1Z
0
Pt (j)Xt (j) dj
thus, we obtain the downward sloping demand for each intermediate input:
Pt
"p
"p   1
0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A
"p
"p 1 1
"p   1
"p
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p
 1   Pt (j) = 0)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A
"p
"p 1 1
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p
 1   Pt (j) = 0)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A
"p
"p 1 1
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p
 1
= Pt (j))
Xt (j)
  1"p =
Pt (j)
Pt
0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A 
1
"p 1
)
Xt (j) =

Pt (j)
Pt
 "p 0@ 1Z
0
Xt (j)
"p 1
"p dj
1A
"
"p 1
)
Xt (j) =

Pt (j)
Pt
 "p
Yt (Eq. A23)
144
Putting (Eq. A23) into (Eq. A21) we obtain the price index:
Yt =
0B@ 1Z
0
 
Pt (j)
Pt
 "p! "p 1"p
Y
"p 1
"p
t dj
1CA
"p
"p 1
)
Y
"p 1
"p
t = Y
"p 1
"p
t
1Z
0

Pt (j)
Pt
1 "p
dj )
1 =
1
P
1 "p
t
1Z
0
(Pt (j))
1 "p dj )
P
1 "p
t =
1Z
0
(Pt (j))
1 "p dj )
Pt =
24 1Z
0
Pt (j)
1 "p dj
35
1
1 "p
(Eq. A24)
4.8.4 INTERMEDIATE GOOD FIRMS.
Taking the production function for a typical intermediate good rm:
Yt (j) = Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1  (Eq. A25)
The maximization of real prots is thus given by:
max
Kt(j);Nt(j)
Ot (j) =
Pt (j)
Pt
Yt (j) RktKt (j) WtNt (j) + t (j)
h
Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1    Yt (j)
i
The FOCs are:
@Ot (j)
@Nt (j)
= 0)
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 Wt + (1  )t (j)Kt (j)Nt (j)  = 0)
(1  )t (j)

Kt (j)
Nt (j)

= Wt (Eq. A26)
and:
@Ot (j)
@Kt (j)
= 0)
 Rkt + t (j)Kt (j) 1Nt (j)1  = 0)
t (j)

Kt (j)
Nt (j)
 1
= Rkt (Eq. A27)
from (Eq. A26) and (Eq. A27):
Wt
Rkt
= (1  )t (j)

Kt (j)
Nt (j)

1

1
t (j)

Kt (j)
Nt (j)
1 
)
Wt
Rkt
=
1  


Kt (j)
Nt (j)

)
Kt (j)
Nt (j)
=

1  
Wt
Rkt
(Eq. A28)
Real marginal cost is common to all rms and given as follows. From (Eq. A26) and
(Eq. A27):
COST (j) = t (j) (1  )

Kt (j)
Nt (j)

Nt (j) + t (j)

Kt (j)
Nt (j)
 1
Kt (j)
= t (j)WtNt (j) + t (j)R
k
tKt (j)
= t (j)Yt (j)
and:
MC (j) =
@COST (j)
@Yt (j)
=
@t (j)Yt (j)
@Yt (j)
= t (j)
where:
Wt = (1  )t (j)

Kt (j)
Nt (j)
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and:
Rkt = t (j)

Kt (j)
Nt (j)
 1
)
 
Rkt
 
 1 = (t (j))

 1

Kt (j)
Nt (j)

thus:
Wt 
Rkt
 
 1
=
(1  )t (j)

Kt(j)
Nt(j)

(t (j))

 1

Kt(j)
Nt(j)
 )
Wt 
Rkt
 
 1
= t (j)
1   1 1  


 1
)
Wt 
Rkt
 
 1
= t (j)
  1 1 1  


 1
)
t (j)
  1 1 =
Wt 
Rkt
 
 1


 1
1   )
t (j) =
(Wt)
 ( 1) 
Rkt
   
(1  ) ( 1)
)
t (j) = (Wt)
1   
Rkt

  (1  ) (1 )
nally:
MCt = 	(Wt)
1   
Rkt

(Eq. A29)
where : 	 =   (1  ) (1 )
4.8.5 PRICE SETTING
A rm resetting its price in period t solves:
max
Pt
Et
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt;t+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
 MCt+k

(Eq. A30)
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subject to the sequence of demand constraints:
Yt+k (j) = Xt+k (j) =

P t
Pt+k
 "p
Yt+k (Eq. A31)
Thus, we can rewrite the problem as:
max
Pt
Et
1X
k=0
k
(
t;t+k

P t
Pt+k
 "p
Yt+k

P t
Pt+k
 MCt+k
)
) max
Pt
Et
1X
k=0
k
(
t;t+kYt+k
 
P t
Pt+k
1 "p
 

P t
Pt+k
 "p
MCt+k
!)
The FOC is the following:
(1  "p) (P

t )
 "p
(Pt+k)
 "p
1
Pt+k
+ "p
(P t )
 "p 1
(Pt+k)
 "p 1
1
Pt+k
MCt+k = 0)
(1  "p) + "p (P

t )
 1
(Pt+k)
 1MCt+k = 0)
P t (1  "p) + "p
(P t ) (P

t )
 1
(Pt+k)
 1 MCt+k = 0)
P t (1  "p) + "pPt+kMCt+k = 0)
P t +
"p
1  "pPt+kMCt+k = 0)
P t
Pt+k
  "p
"p   1MCt+k = 0
thus, we have:
Et
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k

= 0 (Eq. A32)
where : p  "p
"p   1
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4.9 APPENDIX B: LOG-LINEARIZED EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
4.9.1 STEADY STATE ANALYSIS
In this short section we show that the steady state ratio of aggregate consumption
to total output does not depend upon the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. In
doing so, we just notice that the market clearing condition for nal goods implies.
AGGREGATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING.
Yt = Ct + It +Gt )
Ct = Yt   It  Gt
in steady state:
C = Y   I  G
dividing by Y :
C
Y
=
Y
Y
  I
Y
  G
Y
where:
I
Y
=
I
K
K
Y
knowing that:
I
K
= 
we can rewrite:
I
Y
= 
K
Y
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rearranging:
I
Y
= 


1
Y
K
)
I
Y
=

 YK
thus:
C
Y
=
Y
Y
  I
Y
  G
Y
since:
c =
C
Y
g =
G
Y
we can rewrite:
c = 1 

 YK
  g
Moreover, starting from the production function:
Yt (j) = Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1 
@Yt (j)
@Kt (j)
= Rkt )
Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1  1
Kt (j)
t (j) = R
k
t )

Yt (j)
Kt (j)
t (j) = R
k
t
in steady state:

Y
K
t (j) = R
k
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from relation (Eq. 16):
Et
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k

= 0
in steady state:
1  pMC = 0)
MC =
1
p
= t (j)
thus:

Y
K
1
p
= Rk )
Rk =
Y
pK
Knowing that:
Q = 
C
C

Rk +Q

(1  )  0

I
K

I
K
+ 

I
K

)
1 = 
n
Rk +
h
(1  )  0 ()  +  ()
io
)
1 = 

Rk + [(1  )   + ]	)
1 = 

Rk + (1  )	)
1

= Rk + 1   )
Rk =
1

  1 + 
we can equate:
Rk =
1

  1 +  = Y
pK
= Rkt
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solving for:
1

  1 +  = Y
pK
)

Y
K
= p

1

  1 + 

nally:
c = 1 

 YK
  g =
 
1  g
  
 YK
=
 
1  g
  
p

1
   1 + 

NON-MILITARY AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES. In the case of total govern-
ment spending disaggregation, we have:
Yt = Ct + It +NMt +Mt )
Ct = Yt   It  NMt  Mt
in steady state:
C = Y   I  NM  M
dividing by Y :
C
Y
=
Y
Y
  I
Y
  NM
Y
  M
Y
since:
nm =
NM
Y
m =
M
Y
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Finally, applying the same computations as in total government spending case, we
obtain:
c = 1 

 YK
  nm   m = (1  nm   m) 

 YK
= (1  nm   m) 

p

1
   1 + 

4.9.2 LOG-LINEARIZED EQUATIONS
In the present section we derive the log-linear versions of the key optimality and
market-clearing conditions used in our analysis of the models equilibrium dynamics.
Some of these conditions hold exactly, whereas others represent rst-order approxi-
mations around a zero-ination steady state. Henceforth, and unless otherwise noted,
lower-case letters denote log-deviations with respect to the corresponding steady state
values:
xt  log Xt
X
(Eq. A33)
HOUSEHOLDS. Equation (Eq. 30) is obtained log-linearizing expression (Eq. 9):
Qt = Et

t;t+1

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

)
Qt = 
Cot
Cot+1

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

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we know that in steady state:
I
K
= 
)  () = 
) 0 () = 1
and : Q =
1

0   I
K

) Q = 1

0
()
) Q = 1
and :   1

00   I
K

I
K
 
)   1

00
() 
 
thus:
Q = 
C
C

Rk +Q

(1  )  0

I
K

I
K
+ 

I
K

)
1 = 
n
Rk +
h
(1  )  0 ()  +  ()
io
)
1 = 

Rk + [(1  )   + ]	)
1 = 

Rk + (1  )	)
1

= Rk + 1   )
Rk =
1

  1 + 
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we obtain:
Qt = 
Cot
Cot+1

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot+1

Iot+1
Kot+1
+ 

Iot+1
Kot+1

) qtQ = 

1
C
cotC  
C
C2
cot+1C

Rk +Q

(1  )  0

I
K

I
K
+ 

I
K

+
C
C

rkt+1R
k
	
+
C
C

qt+1

(1  )  0

I
K

I
K
+ 

I
K

Q

+
C
C

Q

 00

I
K

1
K
I
K
it+1I

+
C
C

Q

 0

I
K

1
K
it+1I

+
C
C

Q


00

I
K

I
K2
I
K
kt+1K

+
C
C

Q


0

I
K

I
K2
kt+1K

+
C
C

Q


0

I
K

1
K
it+1I

+
C
C

Q

 0

I
K

I
K2
kt+1K

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) qt = 
 
cot   cot+1
 1

  1 +  +
h
(1  )  0 ()  +  ()
i
+rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+qt+1
h
(1  )  0 ()  +  ()
i
 
h

00
() it+1
i
  
h

0
() it+1
i
+ 
h

00
() kt+1
i
+
h

0
() kt+1
i
+ 
h

0
() it+1
i
  
h

0
() kt+1
i
) qt = 
 
cot   cot+1
 1

  1 +  + [(1  )   + ]

+rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+ qt+1 [(1  )   + ]
 
h

00
() it+1
i
+ 
h

00
() kt+1
i
) qt = 
 
cot   cot+1
 1

+ rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+ qt+1 (1  )  
00
()  (it+1   kt+1)
using the log-linearized relationship between Tobins Q and investment:
it   kt = qt
and knowing that:
  1

00
() 
=  ) 00 ()  =  1

we have that:
qt = 
 
cot   cot+1
 1

+ rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+ qt+1   qt+1 +  1

 (qt+1)
) qt = 
 
cot   cot+1
 1

+ rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+ qt+1   qt+1 + qt+1
) qt = 
 
cot   cot+1
 1

+ rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+ qt+1
) qt =
 
cot   cot+1

+ rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+ qt+1
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using the log-linearized Euler equation:
cot = Et

cot+1
	  (rt   Et ft+1g)
) cot   Et

cot+1
	
=   (rt   Et ft+1g)
nally, we obtain expression (Eq. 30):
qt =   (rt   Et ft+1g) + rkt+1

1

  1 + 

+ qt+1 )
qt = Et fqt+1g+ 

1

  1 + 

Et

rkt+1
	  (rt   Et ft+1g))
qt = Et fqt+1g+ [1   (1  )]Et

rkt+1
	  (rt   Et ft+1g)
Equation (Eq. 31) is obtained log-linearizing (Eq. 10):
Qt =
1

0

Iot
Kot
 )
Qt = 
0

It
Kt
 1
)
qtQ = ( 1)
0

I
K
 2

00

I
K

1
K
itI   
00

I
K

I
K2
ktK

)
qtQ = ( 1)
0
()
 2


00
() it   
00
() kt

)
qt = ( 1)


00
()  (it   kt)

knowing that:
  1

00
() 
=  ) 00 ()  =  1

we have expression (Eq. 31):
qt = ( 1)

 1

(it   kt)

)
qt = it   kt )
it   kt = qt
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The log-linearized capital accumulation equation (Eq. 32) is obtained from ex-
pression (Eq. 6):
Kot+1 = (1  )Kot + 

Iot
Kot

Kot )
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + 

It
Kt

Kt )
kt+1K = (1  ) ktK + 
0

I
K

1
K
KitI   
0

I
K

I
K2
KktK + 

I
K

ktK )
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + 
0

I
K

I
K
it   
0

I
K

I
K
kt + 

I
K

kt )
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + 
0
() it   
0
() kt +  () kt )
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it   kt + kt )
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it )
kt+1 = it + (1  ) kt
The log-linearized Euler equation for optimizing households (Eq. 33) is given as
follows. From equation (Eq. 7):
1 = RtEt

t;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

and (Eq. 8):
t;t+k = 
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
thus, we obtain expression (Eq. 33):
1 = Rt
Cot
Cot+1
Pt
Pt+1
)
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C
C
P
P
rtR+R
1
C
P
P
cotC  R
C
C2
P
P
cot+1C +R
C
C
1
P
ptP  RC
C
P
P 2
pt+1P = 0)
rtR+Rc
o
t  Rcot+1 +Rpt  Rpt+1 = 0)
rt + c
o
t   cot+1 + pt   pt+1 = 0)
cot = c
o
t+1   rt + pt+1   pt )
cot = c
o
t+1   rt + t+1 )
cot = Et

cot+1
	  (rt   Et ft+1g)
The log-linearized equation of consumption for non-Ricardian households (Eq.
34) is obtained from equation (Eq. 13):
Crt = WtN
r
t   T rt )
crtC = N
rwtW +Wn
r
tN
r   (T rt   T r))
crtC
r = WNr (wt + n
r
t )  (T rt   T r))
crt =

WNr
Cr

(wt + n
r
t ) 
1
Cr
(T rt   T r)
Y
Y
)
crt =

WNr
Cr

(wt + n
r
t ) 

Y
Cr

T rt   T r
Y
)
crt =

WNr
Cr

(wt + n
r
t ) 

Y
Cr

trt
since : trt =
T rt   T r
Y
The log-linearized expression for aggregate consumption (Eq. 35) is obtained,
assuming Cr = Co = C, from equation (Eq. 26):
Ct = C
r
t + (1  )Cot )
ctC = c
r
tC
r + (1  ) cotCo )
ct = c
r
t + (1  ) cot
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Equivalently, the log-linearization equation (Eq. 36), assuming that Cr = Co = C,
gives expression (Eq. 27):
Nt = N
r
t + (1  )Not )
ntN = n
r
tN
r + (1  )notNo )
nt = n
r
t + (1  )not
Since we have assumed a non-competitive labour market structure, we can de-
rive the intertemporal equilibrium condition for aggregate consumption (Eq. 38) as
follows. We rst substitute expression (Eq. 37) into expression (Eq. 34), yielding:
crt =

WN
C

(ct + 'nt + nt) 

Y
C

trt )
crt =

WN
C

(ct + (1 + ')nt) 

Y
C

trt )
crt =

(1  ) Y
C
1
p

(ct + (1 + ')nt) 

Y
C

trt )
crt =

(1  )
c
p

(ct + (1 + ')nt) 

1
c

trt )
crt =
(1  )
c
p
ct +
(1  ) (1 + ')
c
p
nt  

1
c

trt
We proceed to use the operator
 
1  L 1 in the previous expression, yielding:
crt   Et

crt+1
	
=
(1  )
c
p
[ct   Et fct+1g] (Eq. A34)
+
(1  ) (1 + ')
c
p
[nt   Et fnt+1g] 

1
c

trt   Et

trt+1
	
We also apply the operator
 
1  L 1 to expression (Eq. 35), which yields:
ct   ct+1 = 

crt   crt+1

+ (1  ) cot   cot+1
160
Finally, we substitute expressions (Eq. A34) and (Eq. 33) into the previous one,
which after rearranging terms yields an Euler equation for aggregate consumption
(Eq. 38).
Thus, knowing that:
crt   Et

crt+1
	
=
(1  )
c
p
[ct   Et fct+1g]
+
(1  ) (1 + ')
c
p
[nt   Et fnt+1g] 

1
c

trt   Et

trt+1
	
and:
cot = c
o
t+1   (rt   t+1)
we substitute:
ct   ct+1 = 
264 (1 )cp [ct   ct+1]
+ (1 )(1+')cp [nt   nt+1] 

1
c
 
trt   trt+1

375+ (1  ) [  (rt   t+1)]
) ct   ct+1    (1  )
c
p
[ct   ct+1] = 
264 (1 )(1+')cp [nt   nt+1]
 

1
c
 
trt   trt+1

375  (1  ) [rt   t+1]
) ct    (1  )
c
p
ct   ct+1 +  (1  )
c
p
ct+1 = 
264 (1 )(1+')cp [nt   nt+1]
 

1
c
 
trt   trt+1

375  (1  ) [rt   t+1]
) ct

1   (1  )
c
p

= ct+1

1   (1  )
c
p

+ 
264 (1 )(1+')cp [nt   nt+1]
 

1
c
 
trt   trt+1

375  (1  ) [rt   t+1]
) ct

c
p    (1  )
c
p

= ct+1

c
p    (1  )
c
p

+
264 (1 )(1+')cp [nt   nt+1]
 

1
c
 
trt   trt+1

375 (1  ) [rt   t+1]
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) ct = ct+1

c
p
c
p    (1  )
 
c
p    (1  )
c
p

 

c
p
c
p    (1  )



  (1  ) (1 + ')
c
p
[nt+1   nt] +

1
c

trt+1   trt

 

c
p
c
p    (1  )

(1  ) [rt   t+1]
) ct = ct+1   c
p (1  )
c
p    (1  ) [rt   t+1]
  (1  ) (1 + ')
c
p    (1  ) [nt+1   nt] +
p
c
p    (1  )

trt+1   trt

) ct = ct+1   c
p (1  )
c
p    (1  ) (rt   t+1)
  (1  ) (1 + ')
c
p    (1  ) (nt+1) +
p
c
p    (1  )
 
trt+1

or, more compactly:
ct = ct+1   1
~
(rt   Et ft+1g) nEt fnt+1g+tEt

trt+1
	
where :
1
~
= c
p (1  )
 = (c
p    (1  )) 1
n =  (1  ) (1 + ')
t = 
p
which are the coe¢ cients of this expression in the text.
FIRMS. Log-linearization of expressions (Eq. 16) and (Eq. 17) gives the ination
equation (Eq. 39). Indeed, from expression (Eq. 17):
Pt =
h
P
1 "p
t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "p
i 1
1 "p
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we have that in steady state:
P 1 "p = P 1 "p + (1  ) (P )1 "p )
P 1 "p (1  ) = (1  ) (P )1 "p )
P = P 
Again from (Eq. 17):
P
1 "p
t = P
1 "p
t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "p
dividing by P 1 "pt , we obtain:
P
1 "p
t
P
1 "p
t
= 
P
1 "p
t 1
P
1 "p
t
+ (1  ) (P

t )
1 "p
P
1 "p
t
dening:
Vt =
P t
Pt
and : V = 1
we have:
1 = 

Pt 1
Pt
1 "p
+ (1  )V 1 "pt
log-linearizing this expression:
(1  "p) 

P
P
 "p 1
P
pt 1P   (1  "p) 

P
P
 "p P
P 2
ptP + (1  "p) (1  )V  "pvtV = 0)
pt 1   pt + (1  ) vt = 0)
  (pt   pt 1) + (1  ) vt = 0)
(1  ) vt = t )
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thus:
vt =

1  t (Eq. A35)
Moreover, from (Eq. 16):
Et
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k

= 0)
Et
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k

= 0
in steady state we have that:
Y

P 
P
  pMC

= 0)
1  pMC = 0)
MC =
1
p
Again from (Eq. 16):
1X
k=0
k

t;t+kYt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k

= 0)
1X
k=0
k
(
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
Yt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k
)
= 0
multiplying both sides for PtPt gives:
1X
k=0
k
(
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
Yt+k (j)
Pt
P t

P t
Pt+k
  pMCt+k
)
= 0)
1X
k=0
k
(
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
Yt+k (j)

P t
Pt+k
Pt
P t
  pMCt+k Pt
P t
)
= 0)
1X
k=0
k
(
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
Yt+k (j)

Pt
Pt+k
  pMCt+k 1
Vt
)
= 0
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log-linearizing this expression:
1X
k=0
k
(
k

Cot+k
Cot
 1
Yt+k (j)

Pt
Pt+k
  pMCt+k 1
Vt
)
= 0)
 
1X
k=0
kk

Co
Co
 2
1
C
Y

P
P
  pMC 1
V

cot+kC
+
1X
k=0
kk

Co
Co
 2
C
C2
Y

P
P
  pMC 1
V

cotC
+
1X
k=0
kk

Co
Co
 1
P
P
  pMC 1
V

yt+k (j)Y
+
1X
k=0
kk

Co
Co
 1
Y

1
P

ptP
 
1X
k=0
kk

Co
Co
 1
Y

P
P 2

pt+kP
 
1X
k=0
kk

Co
Co
 1
Y p
1
V
mct+kMC
+
1X
k=0
kk

Co
Co
 1
Y pMC
1
V 2
vtV
= 0)
1X
k=0
kkpt  
1X
k=0
kkpt+k  
1X
k=0
kkmct+k +
1X
k=0
kkvt = 0)
1X
k=0
kkvt =
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k   pt +mct+k))
vt
1X
k=0
kk =
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k   pt +mct+k)
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since:
0 < kk < 1)
1X
k=0
kk =
1
1  
Thus, we can rewrite:
vt
1
1   =
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k   pt +mct+k))
vt
1
1   =
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k +mct+k) 
1X
k=0
kkpt )
vt
1
1   =
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k +mct+k)  pt
1X
k=0
kk )
vt
1
1   =
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k +mct+k)  pt 1
1   )
vt
1
1   + pt
1
1   =
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k +mct+k))
vt + pt = (1  )
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k +mct+k) (Eq. A36)
Last expression can be rewritten as:
vt + pt = (1  ) (pt +mct) +  (pt+1 + vt+1) (Eq. A37)
Now we demonstrate that expressions (Eq. A36) and (Eq. A37) are equivalent.
Indeed, taking equation (Eq. A37) at t  1:
vt 1 + pt 1 = (1  ) (pt 1 +mct 1) +  (pt + vt))
  (vt 1 + pt 1) +  (pt + vt) =   (1  ) (pt 1 +mct 1))
(pt + vt)  1

(vt 1 + pt 1) =   (1  )

(pt 1 +mct 1)
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dening:
lt = pt + vt
ut 1 = pt 1 +mct 1
 =
1

 =   (1  )

we have:
lt   lt 1 = ut 1 )
lt 1 =  1lt    1ut 1
lagging one period:
lt = 
 1lt+1    1ut ) 
1   1L 1 lt =   1ut
where :  1 < 1
and : L is the lag operator
thus:
lt =   1 1 
1   1L 1ut )
lt =   1

1X
k=0
 kut+k
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substituting, we obtain expression (Eq. A36):
pt + vt =  

  (1  )


()
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k +mct+k))
pt + vt = (1  )
1X
k=0
kk (pt+k +mct+k)
Thus, taking equation (Eq. A37):
vt + pt = (1  ) (pt +mct) +  (pt+1 + vt+1))
vt + pt = pt +mct   pt   mct +  (pt+1 + vt+1))
vt = mct (1  ) +  (pt+1   pt + vt+1))
vt = mct (1  ) +  (t+1 + vt+1) (Eq. A38)
putting expression (Eq. A35) into (Eq. A38) gives:

1  t = mct (1  ) + 

t+1 +

1  t+1

)

1  t = mct (1  ) + 

1 +

1  

t+1 )

1  t = mct (1  ) + 

1  t+1 )
t = t+1 + (1  ) (1  ) 1

mct )
Moreover, starting from the production function:
Yt (j) = Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1 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@Yt (j)
@Kt (j)
= Rkt )
Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1  1
Kt (j)
t (j) = R
k
t )

Yt (j)
Kt (j)
t (j) = R
k
t
since we know that:
MCt = t (j)
we can rewrite:

Yt (j)
Kt (j)
MCt = R
k
t
log-linearizing the last expression:

1
K
MCytY    Y
K2
MCktK + 
Y
K
mctMC = r
k
tR
k )
yt   kt +mct = rkt )
mct =  yt + kt + rkt )
 mct = (yt   kt)  rkt
Equivalently, starting from the production function:
Yt (j) = Kt (j)

Nt (j)
1 
@Yt (j)
@Nt (j)
= Wt )
(1  )Kt (j)Nt (j)  t (j) = Wt )
(1  )Kt (j)Nt (j)1  t (j) = Nt (j)Wt )
(1  )Yt (j)t (j) = Nt (j)Wt
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since we know that:
MCt = t (j)
we can rewrite:
(1  )Yt (j)MCt = Nt (j)Wt
log-linearizing the last expression:
(1  )MCytY + (1  )Y mctMC = WntN +NwtW )
yt +mct = nt + wt )
mct =  yt + nt + wt )
 mct = (yt   nt)  wt
With this procedure we have obtained equations (Eq. 39), (Eq. 40) and (Eq. 41):
t =  ft+1g   p^pt
where : p = (1  ) (1  ) 1

and : mct = ^
p
t
knowing that:
^pt = (yt   nt)  wt
or, equivalently:
^pt = (yt   kt)  rkt
170
The log-linearized aggregate production function (Eq. 42) is obtained from ex-
pression (Eq. 15):
Yt = K

t N
1 
t )
ytY = K
 1N1 ktK + (1  )KN ntN )
ytY = K
N1 kt + (1  )KN1 nt )
ytY =
 
KN1 

(kt + (1  )nt)
knowing that in steady state:
Y = KN1 
nally, we have:
yt = (1  )nt + kt
FISCAL POLICY.
AGGREGATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING. The log-linearized government bud-
get constraint (Eq. 43) is obtained from expression (Eq. 19). From (Eq. 19):
PtTt +R
 1
t Bt+1 = Bt + PtGt
dividing for PtY :
Tt
1
Y
+R 1t
Bt+1
Pt
1
Y
=
Bt
Pt
1
Y
+Gt
1
Y
)
Tt   T
Y
  1
R2
B
P
1
Y
(Rt  R) + 1
R
1
P
1
Y
(Bt+1  B)  1
R
B
P 2
1
Y
(Pt   P )
=
1
P
(Bt  B) 1
Y
  B
P 2
1
Y
(Pt   P ) + Gt  G
Y
)
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assuming steady state with zero debt:
Tt   T
Y
+ 
Bt+1
P
1
Y
=
Bt
P
1
Y
+
Gt  G
Y
)

Bt+1
P
1
Y
=
Bt
P
1
Y
+
Gt  G
Y
  Tt   T
Y
)
assuming a balanced primary budget:
Pt 1 = Pt = P
we obtain:
bt+1 =
1

(bt + gt   tt)
where : bt =

Bt
Pt 1

1
Y
gt =
Gt  G
Y
tt =
Tt   T
Y
MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES. The log-linearized gov-
ernment budget constraint (Eq. 44) is obtained from expression (Eq. 22). From (Eq.
22):
PtTt +R
 1
t Bt+1 = Bt + Pt (NMt +Mt))
PtTt +R
 1
t Bt+1 = Bt + PtNMt + PtMt
dividing for PtY :
Tt
1
Y
+R 1t
Bt+1
Pt
1
Y
=
Bt
Pt
1
Y
+NMt
1
Y
+Mt
1
Y
)
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Tt   T
Y
  1
R2
B
P
1
Y
(Rt  R) + 1
R
1
P
1
Y
(Bt+1  B)  1
R
B
P 2
1
Y
(Pt   P )
=
1
P
(Bt  B) 1
Y
  B
P 2
1
Y
(Pt   P ) + Mt  M
Y
+
NMt  NM
Y
)
assuming steady state with zero debt:
Tt   T
Y
+ 
Bt+1
P
1
Y
=
Bt
P
1
Y
+
Mt  M
Y
+
NMt  NM
Y
)

Bt+1
P
1
Y
=
Bt
P
1
Y
+
Mt  M
Y
+
NMt  NM
Y
  Tt   T
Y
)
assuming a balanced primary budget:
Pt 1 = Pt = P
we obtain:
bt+1 =
1

(bt + nmt +mt   tt)
where : bt =

Bt
Pt 1

1
Y
mt =
Mt  M
Y
nmt =
NMt  NM
Y
tt =
Tt   T
Y
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MARKET CLEARING. Log-linearization of the market clearing condition of the
nal good around the steady state yields the following expression:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt )
ytY = ctC + itI + (Gt  G))
yt
Y
Y
= ct
C
Y
+ it
I
Y
+ (Gt  G) 1
Y
)
yt = cct + iit + gt
since : c =
C
Y
i =
I
Y
gt =
Gt  G
Y
In the case of disaggregation of government component the log-linearized market
clearing condition is given by:
Yt = Ct + It +NMt +Mt )
ytY = ctC + itI + (NMt  NM) + (Mt  M))
yt
Y
Y
= ct
C
Y
+ it
I
Y
+ (NMt  NM) 1
Y
+ (Mt  M) 1
Y
)
yt = cct + iit + nmt +mt
since : nmt =
NMt  NM
Y
mt =
Mt  M
Y
4.10 APPENDIX C: NON-COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET
In the present section we describe a model of wage determination that generate a
log-linear aggregate equilibrium condition corresponding to (Eq. 37) in the text.
Consider a model with a continuum of unions, each of which represents workers of a
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certain type. E¤ective labour input hired by rm j is a CES function of the quantities
of the di¤erent labour types employed:
Nt (j) =
0@ 1Z
0
Nt (j; i)
"w 1
"w di
1A
"w
"w 1
where "w is the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent types of households. The
fraction of non-Ricardian and Ricardian consumers is uniformly distributed across
worker types (and hence across unions). Each period, a typical union (say, represent-
ing worker of type z) sets the wage for its workers in order to maximize the objective
function:

"
1
Crt (z)
Wt (z)Nt (z)  N
1+'
t (z)
1 + '
#
+ (1  )
"
1
Cot (z)
Wt (z)Nt (z)  N
1+'
t (z)
1 + '
#
subject to a labour demand schedule:
Nt (z) =

Wt (z)
Wt
 "w
Nt
We can write this maximization problem as:
max
Wt(z)
8><>: 
h
1
Crt (z)
Wt (z)Nt (z)  N
1+'
t (z)
1+'
i
+(1  )
h
1
Cot (z)
Wt (z)Nt (z)  N
1+'
t (z)
1+'
i
9>=>;
s:t : Nt (z) =

Wt (z)
Wt
 "w
Nt
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thus:
max
Wt(z)
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

24 1
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
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9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
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Because consumption will generally di¤er between the two types of consumers, the
union weighs labour income with their respective marginal utility of consumption
(i.e., 1Crt and
1
Cot
). Notice that, in writing down the problem, we have assumed that
the union takes into account the fact that rms allocate labour demand uniformly
across di¤erent workers of type z, independently of their household type. It follows
that, in the aggregate, we will have Nrt = Not = Nt for all t. The rst order condition of
this problem can be written as follows (after invoking symmetry, and thus dropping
the z index):

264 1Crt (z) (1  "w) (Wt (z)) "w W "wt Nt
+
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264 1Cot (z) (1  "w) (Wt (z)) "w W "wt Nt
+
"w(1+')(Wt(z))
 "w(1+') 1W "w(1+')t N
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w (Eq. A39)
where : MRSrt = C
r
tN
'
t
MRSot = C
o
tN
'
t
w =
"w
"w   1
knowing that: 

MRSr
+
1  
MRSo

W = w
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Log-linearizing expression (Eq. A39) and ignoring constant terms yields the wage
schedule:
  W
(MRSr)
2mrs
r
tMRS
r   (1  )W
(MRSo)
2mrs
o
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
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+
1  
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
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  W
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+
(1  )W
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
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since:
r =
W
MRSrw
o =
W
MRSow
we can rewrite:
wt = rmrs
r
t + omrs
o
t
where:
MRSr = CrN' )
mrsrtMRS
r = N'crtC
r + 'CrN' 1ntN )
mrsrtMRS
r = CrN'crt + 'C
rN'nt )
mrsrtMRS
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r
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and:
MRSo = CoN' )
mrsotMRS
o = N'cotC
o + 'CoN' 1ntN )
mrsotMRS
o = CoN'cot + 'C
oN'nt )
mrsotMRS
o = CoN' (cot + 'nt))
mrsot = c
o
t + 'nt
thus:
wt = r (c
r
t + 'nt) + o (c
o
t + 'nt))
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r
t + oc
o
t + r'nt + o'nt
since:
~ct = rc
r
t + oc
o
t
we can rewrite:
wt = ~ct + ' (r + o)nt
We note that, to the extent that tax policy equates steady state consumption across
household types (i.e., Cr = Co) we will have:
MRSr =MRSo
and, hence:
r = 
o = 1  
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We can then rewrite the previous equilibrium condition as:
wt = ct + 'nt
which corresponds to the equation (Eq. 37) in the text. Under the present scenario
we assume that the wage mark-up w is su¢ ciently large (and the shocks su¢ ciently
small) so that the conditions Wt > MRSjt = CoN' for j = r; o are satised for all t.
Both conditions guarantee that both type of households will be willing to meet rms
labour demand at the prevailing wage.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis we analyse the impact of government expenditure on U.S. economy,
with particular attention on the spending devolved to the defence sector. In the
three chapters presented above, we have obtained several interesting results that can
be summarized as follows. In chapter 1, we empirically test the so called military
Keynesianism hypothesis taking into account two di¤erent aspects. First, our infer-
ences are adjusted for a structural break exhibited by the data concerning scal and
monetary variables. Second, we show that the results are sensitive to a sub sample
choice. The estimated elasticity of government defence spending on output shows a
lack of signicance in the more recent years of the sample, indicating that the e¤ect
of government spending defence on output is very weak.
This result is conrmed in chapter 2 where our ndings indicate a much larger
positive e¤ect of non-military spending on the economy with respect to the rise of
resources devolved to military sector. In this chapter, we propose a New Keynesian
DSGE model featuring limited asset market participation and taking into account
a scal policy composed by civilian and military sectors. Bayesian estimates of the
theoretical model provide consistent evidence that defence spending has a weaker
e¤ect on private consumption and wages with respect to civilian spending. In this
chapter, we also show that an increase in total government spending and its compo-
nents leads to a sustained rise in consumption and wages in the period 1954-1979,
but has less important e¤ects on these variables after 1982. Our empirical results
conrm that this relevant change in the scal shocks can be related to the increase
of agentsparticipation in asset market.
Finally, chapter 3 shows two relevant aspects concerning the impact of public
spending on the economy. First, we analyse the "within" relationship of the dif-
ferent public spending components, nding a clear substitute e¤ect in the resources
devolved to defence sector with respect to the resources devolved to non-defence sec-
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tor. The second aspect is related to the way of nancing total public expenditure and
its components. In particular, our results show that the military spending is nanced
by an increase in government budget decit, contrary to the civilian spending case.
Starting from these aspects we nd two main results using a structural VAR method
and a DSGE model simulation. On one side civilian spending has a positive e¤ect on
GDP and private consumption. On the other side, output and consumption respond
negatively to an increase of military expenditure. As a consequence, the rst re-
sult strengthens the new-Keynesian theoretical approach whereas the second nding
seems to conrm the standard neoclassical wealth e¤ect.
Overall, these results suggest that trying to measure the impact on private con-
sumption by considering the whole government expenditure aggregate - and not its
decomposition according to features and goals - can be misleading. Moreover, U.S.
economy seems to have greater returns from non-military spending. Thus, giving
government priorities in favour of supplying civilian goods and services rather than
nancing federal defence spending may be a good recovery plan after the severity of
the last economic downturn followed the global nancial crisis.
As further extensions of the present thesis, we believe interesting to focus in
two directions. First, we would like to compare the three di¤erent approaches to the
identication of scal policy shocks presented in VAR literature and well summarized
in the paper of Perotti (2005). Apart from the identication issue, our analysis should
show that the e¤ects of public spending on the economy depends on the "within"
substitutivity/complementarity of government spending components. It should be
also interesting to assess the existence of an indirect and contrasting channel for the
e¤ects of specic government components of expenditure on private consumption.
A second aspect that we should investigate concerns a comparison between the
e¤ects of scal policies in U.S. and Euro area. As it is well known, the overwhelm-
ing majority of the studies are concerned with U.S. economy, with scarce evidence
collected for other countries. Thus, focusing on the Euro area we could analyse the
186
similarities and the di¤erences with the American economy.
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